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Abstract 
Dual apprenticeship training is increasingly seen as an important educational track that provides youth 
with the skills necessary for a smooth transition into the labour market. However, providing skills at the 
workplace rather than at (vocational) school comes at a cost for firms that hire such apprentices. 
Nonetheless, as apprentices become part of a firm’s workforce, they also generate a benefit from working 
productively. This paper provides a theoretical framework and the latest empirical evidence about a firm’s 
costs and benefits that are associated with offering dual apprenticeship training. While many aspects of 
such training are determined by external factors such as government policies, training regulations, and 
labour market institutions, firms can still influence many other aspects. The available empirical evidence 
suggests that there is no single optimal model of dual apprenticeship training. However, given the 
differences in the institutional setting across countries, adjusting key framework conditions can allow 
training firms to generate a sufficiently high return on their training investments. The main parameters 
affecting the cost–benefit ratio are apprentice wages, amount of training provided at the workplace, 
apprenticeship duration, and the manner in which firms integrate apprentices into the production process 
(to perform both skilled and unskilled tasks). An important prerequisite to successful apprenticeships, 
however, is also an adequate supply of suitable apprentices, which in turn (among other factors) depends 
on the training quality at the workplace, certification of the acquired skills, and future wages and career 
opportunities from obtaining a vocational qualification.  
Résumé 
La formation en alternance est de plus en plus considérée comme une filière importante qui dote les 
jeunes des compétences dont ils ont besoin pour entrer sans difficulté sur le marché du travail. La 
formation sur le lieu de travail plutôt que dans un établissement d’enseignement (professionnel) a toutefois 
un coût pour les entreprises qui font appel à des apprentis. Néanmoins, étant donné que les apprentis font 
partie des effectifs de l’entreprise, ils génèrent aussi des bénéfices en travaillant de façon productive. Le 
présent document fournit un cadre théorique et les dernières données empiriques sur les coûts et les 
bénéfices liés au fait, pour les entreprises, de proposer des formations en alternance. Si de nombreux 
aspects de la formation sont déterminés par des facteurs externes comme les politiques gouvernementales, 
les réglementations applicables à la formation, et les institutions du marché du travail, les entreprises 
peuvent encore influencer de nombreux autres aspects. D’après les données empiriques disponibles, il 
n’existe pas de modèle optimal unique de formation en alternance. Compte tenu des différences des 
environnements institutionnels entre les pays, le fait d’ajuster certaines conditions clés du cadre permet aux 
entreprises formatrices de générer un rendement suffisamment élevé de leur investissement dans la 
formation. Les principaux paramètres qui influencent le rapport coûts-bénéfices sont les salaires des 
apprentis, le volume de formation fourni sur le lieu de travail, la durée de l’apprentissage, et la façon dont 
les entreprises intègrent les apprentis dans le processus de production (pour effectuer des tâches à la fois 
qualifiées et non qualifiées). Une importante condition préalable à la réussite de l’apprentissage, toutefois, 
est aussi une offre suffisante d’apprentis compétents, laquelle dépend à son tour (entre autres facteurs) de 
la qualité de la formation sur le lieu de travail, de la validation des compétences acquises, et des 
perspectives futures de salaire et de carrière qu’offre un diplôme professionnel.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Considering the high levels of youth unemployment in Europe, many recent initiatives attempt to 
increase the number of apprenticeships in several European countries with the aim to improve the labour 
market outcomes of young individuals (European Commission 2015a,b). In particular, dual apprenticeship 
training that contains a large component of workplace education is seen as a promising educational 
pathway so that young individuals can acquire the skills and experience required to successfully obtain 
adequate jobs after graduation. 
However, a necessary requirement for successful apprenticeship schemes is a firm’s willingness to 
invest in apprenticeship training. Thus, while not being the only factor, costs and benefits of such training 
are an important determinant of a firm’s training decision. Moreover, costs and benefits themselves are 
determined by various factors outside a firm’s control, such as government policies, programme design, or 
institutional and labour market factors, whereas other aspects of apprenticeship training can be influenced 
by training firms themselves. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the determinants of the costs and benefits of apprenticeship 
training, and the effects of these factors on both the demand for, and the supply of, apprentices. The 
apprenticeship market follows the same basic economic principles as a labour market for skilled workers. 
However, even though apprentice wages are often the highest training cost component, instructor salaries 
and other expenditures for training equipment may be equally important sometimes, and hence, non-wage 
labour costs for apprentices are relatively more important compared to unskilled or skilled labour. 
Moreover, apprentices typically spend a substantial fraction of their time away from the workplace to 
attend vocational school or other courses, and have a low initial productivity in skilled tasks. Finally, the 
supply of apprentices may not as strongly depend on apprentice wages compared to how skilled labour 
supply depends on skilled worker wages, because apprenticeship training typically lasts only three or four 
years. Thus, the supply of apprentices is also largely influenced by expected future wages and career 
opportunities after graduation. Consequently, individuals might be willing to accept a low apprentice wage 
during the apprenticeship period, as long as they expect sufficiently high future benefits associated with 
successfully acquired vocational qualification. 
The empirical evidence about the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training is rather scarce, and 
large-scale firm-level representative surveys are limited to Germany and Switzerland. Nonetheless, the 
available evidence suggests that there is a large heterogeneity with respect to costs and benefits of 
apprenticeship training, not only across countries and training occupations, but also within a particular 
training occupation. Depending on the labour market situation, apprenticeship training must generate short-
run returns to firms, particularly when labour mobility is high, so that expected post-training benefits from 
training apprentices are low. Conversely, firms might be willing to invest in training when they expect to 
be able to retain suitable apprentices as skilled workers, thereby improving the match quality and saving on 
future hiring and firing costs. While it is difficult to estimate the expected returns to apprenticeship training 
for firms located in countries that currently do not have an established dual vocational education and 
training (VET) system, this paper’s results should help to assess the potential costs and benefits of 
apprenticeship training under different hypothetical scenarios.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical background, 
components of the cost–benefit model, and empirical evidence on the returns to apprenticeship training for 
firms. Section 3 provides the additional empirical evidence on how different factors affect the costs and 
benefits of apprenticeship training. Section 4 concludes.  
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2.  COSTS AND BENEFITS OF APPRENTICESHIP TRAINING TO COMPANIES 
 
This section discusses the theoretical framework underlying the costs and benefits of apprenticeship 
training, the related measurement methods, the factors influencing the different cost components, and the 
effects of such costs and benefits on a firm’s demand for apprentices. 
2.1. Theoretical framework 
 
Related literature 
 The costs and benefits of apprenticeship training are an important determinant of a firm’s 
decision to take on apprentices because it is at its own discretion to offer apprenticeships. According to the 
classical human capital theory (Becker, 1962), apprenticeship training may be classified as general or firm-
specific human capital. In the case of competitive labour markets, a firm would never make a net 
investment in general skills, as individuals require a wage that is equal to their value of their productivity. 
Thus, a firm would not be able to extract any profit after training, because an employee could simply quit 
and work for a different firm that offers a wage (i.e. the outside option) equal to the value of the 
employee’s productivity. However, in the case of firm-specific human capital, both the firm and the worker 
share the costs and the returns associated with an investment in apprenticeship training. The reason for 
such sharing is the hold-up problem that would give either party an incentive to claim all the benefits in the 
post-training period.
1
 
 Dual apprenticeship training is a special type of training, as apprentices are hired specifically for 
the period of the apprenticeship programme, and the apprenticeship contract expires automatically after the 
end of training. Lindley (1975) discusses the two main motives as to why a firm would be willing to take 
on apprentices: (i) production motive, and (ii) investment motive (see also Merrilees, 1983). For the first 
motive, the relevance of the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training are immediately clear: if a firm’s 
main motive is to use apprentices for production during the apprenticeship period and does not wish to 
subsequently retain the graduated apprentices, then a firm would never hire an apprentice if the expected 
training costs exceed the expected training benefits. A similar logic applies if the firm expects that most 
apprentices will leave the firm voluntarily after training, for example, to pursue further studies or to go on 
and work for a different firm. Consequently, when a firm trains according to the production motive, 
apprentice pay must adjust so that the productive contribution of the apprentice covers a firm’s training 
expenditures.  
Regarding the investment-oriented training motive, the training benefits do not necessarily need to 
outweigh the training costs in the short-run, as long as a firm can expect sufficiently high post-training 
benefits. There are many potential sources for post-training benefits. The first important post-training 
benefit is related to savings on hiring costs for future skilled workers. Stevens (1994) models the training 
decision of the firm as an investment in the future skilled workforce, when firms first invest in the training 
for young people. However, by successfully retaining apprentices as skilled workers, a firm can 
subsequently save on recruitment costs for skilled workers. Obviously, this kind of post-training benefit 
will only be of relevance if there is in fact a scarcity of skilled workers in the external labour market. As 
long as the firm can easily hire suitable and experienced workers at low costs, the (net) costs of 
                                                     
1 Given that a firm were to finance all of the specific training, a worker could simply quit when not being granted a wage increase 
after training. Conversely, if the worker makes the investment, the firm has no incentives to offer higher pay after 
training, as firm-specific human capital does not raise the worker’s outside option (because firm-specific human capital 
can – by definition – only be used productively in the firm where it was acquired).  
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apprenticeship training may exceed the costs of external hiring. However, in times of skilled worker 
shortages – within particular industries or in general due to, for example, demographic change – this type 
of post-training benefit can be substantial.  
 The second type of post-training benefit arises if firms can select better qualified individuals as 
skilled workers. Because of asymmetric information, a firm will always take time to assess whether an 
individual’s skills and abilities, personality traits, etc. are a good match with its job requirements.2 Thus, by 
the end of a three- or four-year apprenticeship programme, the firm’s knowledge about an individual 
apprentice is considerably higher compared to the situation where external candidates are interviewed in 
the selection process (even when considering more sophisticated hiring procedures, such as assessment 
centres).  
There are many additional potential post-training benefits. Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999) argue 
that because of information asymmetries, firms might be able to extract rent from training by paying a 
wage that is lower than the value of the employee’s productivity, as outside firms cannot accurately 
determine an employee’s productivity. Owing to mobility and job search costs, employees who receive 
training will thus remain with the training firm, even though there might be other employers who would be 
willing to offer higher pay.
3
 Blatter et al. (2016) show for Switzerland that the separation rate is 
substantially lower in training firms (10.2%) than in non-training firms (14.7%), indicating that training 
firms may indeed be able to reduce turnover. Moreover, apprenticeship training may serve as a signal of 
good work climate. Backes-Gellner and Tuor (2010) show that German firms offering apprenticeships 
have a higher recruitment success from the external labour market compared to non-training firms, as 
reflected in a lower job vacancy rate for skilled blue-collar workers.  
 Taking a different view on human capital, Lazear (2009) argues that there is no firm-specific 
human capital, as it may be very hard to imagine skills that are completely irrelevant to any other 
employer. Instead, Lazear claims that it is the specific combination of general skills that can make them de-
facto firm-specific. Based on the BIBB/IAB qualification and career surveys and BIBB cost–benefit 
surveys, Geel et al. (2011) provide evidence that German firms make a higher net investment in 
occupations that require specific combinations of general skills. Moreover, individuals in such occupations 
are less likely to subsequently change occupations. Related to the transferability of skills acquired during 
apprenticeship training, Fitzenberger et al. (2015) for Germany, and Müller and Schweri (2015) for 
Switzerland, find that apprenticeship training is sufficiently general so that individuals can switch 
employer and occupation without experiencing large wage penalties. Furthermore, Pfeifer et al. (2011) 
calculate based on the German cost–benefit survey in 2007 that the firm-specific component of 
apprenticeship training is on average about 12%. Thus, while apprenticeship training includes some firm-
specific components (that may differ across occupations), most of the accumulated human capital during 
an apprenticeship is useful in other firms as well.  
Measuring the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training 
Calculating the costs of apprenticeship training is less challenging compared to quantifying the 
training benefits. Table 1 summarises the main components of a firm’s training expenditures: (i) labour 
                                                     
2 Lange (2007) shows that it takes three years for a firm to reduce the initial expectation error regarding the ability of a new hire by 
50%. Thus, as apprenticeships typically last between three and four years, it is a valuable screening device for a firm. 
3 Pfeifer (2015) shows for Germany that firms with a more compressed wage structure are more likely to completely finance 
general training courses of their employees (rather than just some fraction of training costs). Pfeifer et al. (2011) show 
that the starting wages of external hires exceed the starting wages of former apprentices in the same firm by only 1%. 
Thus, most gains from apprenticeship training would likely result from a potentially higher ability of former 
apprentices, and not due to wage differences of internal vs. external hires. 
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costs for apprentices, (ii) labour costs for instructors, and (iii) costs for material and infrastructure. The 
remaining cost factors are listed under (iv) other costs. 
Table 1: Training costs from the firm’s perspective 
(i) Labour costs for 
apprentices 
(ii) Labour costs for 
instructors 
(iii) Costs for material and 
infrastructure 
(iv) Other costs 
Apprentice pay 
Full-time instructors 
pay 
Expenses for work station 
used for non-productive 
activities (e.g. machines, 
computers, tools, 
exercise equipment) 
Learning and teaching 
material (e.g. software, 
books), working 
equipment, protective 
clothing, etc. 
Irregular wage payments 
(Bonus, performance pay, 
13
th
 /14
th
 monthly salary, 
etc.) 
Part-time instructors 
pay 
Training centre 
External training 
courses, training-
related fees to 
professional 
associations, training 
funds, etc. 
Other employer contributions  
(e.g. according to tariff 
agreements in Germany, 
travel costs reimbursements, 
compensation for food, or 
living expenditures) 
External instructor 
fees 
Within-firm formal training 
courses  
(away from the workplace 
in separate classrooms) 
Administrative and 
recruitment costs for 
apprentices 
 
In dual apprenticeship systems, such as those of Germany or Switzerland, apprentices sign a training 
contract and receive a monthly salary during the entire training period, even though they spend time away 
from the workplace to attend vocational school or external training courses. Some firms also offer irregular 
wage payments, such as 13
th
 or 14
th
 monthly salaries, Christmas bonuses, or pay for performance (e.g. for 
good grades in vocational school). Moreover, some firms may provide financial assistance for travel 
expenses, living arrangements, or subsidised lunches.  
Labour costs for apprentice instructors constitute the second main cost component of apprenticeship 
training. In the German and Swiss cost–benefit surveys, firms were asked to report the number of 
instruction hours that prevented instructors from carrying out their regular duties at the workplace. Such a 
distinction is particularly important for part-time instructors, who perform skilled work in the firm when 
not engaging in training activities. Thus, if apprentices simply watch an instructor perform certain tasks, 
the corresponding time is not viewed as instruction time that is costly to the firm (because the instructor 
would have been equally productive without an apprentice watching). However, if the instructor stops 
regular work activities, or slows down the work process, then the corresponding time is cost-relevant for 
EDU/WKP(2016)17 
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the firm. In addition, some firms hire external training instructors to teach certain skills at the workplace; 
this cost is also added in the second category. 
Third, a firm may need to buy equipment or materials solely for apprenticeship training. Similar to the 
concept of calculating training hours, only those costs are relevant that arise due to the training of an 
apprentice. Thus, if an apprentice uses a machine while working productively, then no additional costs 
arise from the perspective of the firm. The fact that apprentices might not be as productive compared to 
skilled workers will be considered when calculating the training benefits. Moreover, some (often large 
large) firms have separate training facilities for apprentices or provide formal training in a classroom-like 
setting within the firm. 
Finally, a several other costs arise, such as tuition fees for external courses, books or learning 
software, protective gear, and fees for training funds or professional associations. A firm also needs to 
spend resources to attract and recruit suitable apprentices. Particularly in Germany, demographic change in 
combination with an increased share of university enrolment currently makes it extremely difficult for 
firms to find a sufficient number of suitable apprenticeship candidates. Thus, while some firms offer 
special days for young people to visit the firm and learn about the profession, and subsequently interview 
interested candidates, other firms run assessment centres to recruit suitable school-leavers.  
The benefits from offering apprenticeship training are distinguished chronologically: during training 
(short-term benefits) and after training (long-term benefits), as outlined in Table 2. Short-term benefits to 
the training firm arise until the end of training and consist broadly of the value of unskilled and skilled 
work activities. In the German and Swiss cost–benefit survey, instructors who work daily with apprentices 
at the workplace were asked to estimate the fraction of time in each training year that apprentices perform 
unskilled work (performed by an individual without a vocational qualification) and skilled work 
(performed by an individual with a vocational qualification). The benefit to the training firm from an hour 
of unskilled work is the total number of hours an apprentice spends performing unskilled tasks, multiplied 
by the wage of an unskilled worker within the training firm. The same principle applies for skilled work; 
however, the value to the firm is adjusted by the apprentice’s relative productivity in skilled tasks 
compared to an experienced skilled worker in the firm. For example, if an apprentice takes two hours to 
carry out skilled tasks that an average skilled worker takes only one hour, then the relative productivity of 
the apprentice will be 50%. Thus, in this example, the value to the training firm from having an apprentice 
perform an hour of skilled work equals 50% of the corresponding hourly wage of a skilled worker in the 
firm. 
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Table 2: Training benefits from the firm’s perspective 
Short-run 
training benefits  
(during training) 
Long-run 
training benefits  
(after training period) 
Benefits from unskilled tasks Savings on future hiring costs for skilled workers 
Benefits from skilled tasks 
(adjusted by the relative productivity) 
Shorter vacancy duration 
 Better match quality, lower turnover rate 
 Compressed wage structures 
 
Regarding the long-run benefits from training, the first requirement is that the firm can successfully 
retain the graduated apprentice. While some apprentices may want to leave the firm for personal reasons 
(e.g. to enrol in military services), the firm itself can also influence the retention probability. Even though 
the starting wage might be an important determinant of apprentice turnover, a firm can also offer career 
prospects and job security (e.g. by having a works council). However, another important determinant is 
local labour market conditions (Fitzenberger et al., 2015), as firms may not want to retain all apprentices if 
the business outlook is bad. Moreover, they will not be able to retain all suitable apprentices if the local 
labour market is tight, especially when the competition for graduated apprentices is high.  
 As summarised in Table 2, the main post-training benefits relate to savings on future hiring costs 
of skilled workers, shorter vacancy durations (meaning less productivity loss due to unfilled vacancies), 
better match quality and thus lower future labour turnover rates, and potential profits from being able to 
pay a wage below productivity (due to information asymmetries).  
The next section describes the calculations of the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training in more 
detail, as to how certain components are affected by exogenous and endogenous factors, and how the costs 
and benefits of apprenticeship training relate to the demand for and supply of apprentices. 
Simple analysis of apprentice demand and supply 
The main prerequisite for apprenticeship training to be profitable in the short-run is that a firm will 
need to successfully integrate its apprentices into the production process. To illustrate, a simple production 
function takes the form 𝑞 = 𝑓(𝐸, 𝐿𝑢, 𝐿𝑠, 𝐾), where 𝑞 denotes the output, 𝐸 is the number of apprentices a 
firm employs, 𝐿𝑢 is the number of unskilled workers, 𝐿𝑠 is the number of skilled workers, and 𝐾 is the 
amount of capital.  
The law of diminishing returns implies that increasing employment will result in a lower marginal 
return from employing an additional apprentice, when holding other input factors constant, resulting in a 
downward-sloping demand for apprentices. However, in contrast to the textbook case of a competitive 
labour market for regular workers, the costs 𝑐(𝑤𝐸 , ℎ
𝑇(𝜃), 𝑐𝑜) to employ an apprentice for an entire training 
EDU/WKP(2016)17 
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period not only consist of apprentice wage costs 𝑤𝐸, but also include the amount of training ℎ
𝑇 provided to 
apprentices at the workplace (which also depends on training regulations in a particular occupation, skills 
certification, or quality control 𝜃) and other costs 𝑐𝑜, as discussed in Table 1.  
In perfectly competitive labour markets, the prices for apprentices, unskilled workers, skilled workers, 
and capital cannot be affected by the individual firm (i.e. firms are price takers). A firm’s short-run profit 
function can then be written as Π = 𝑝𝑞 − 𝑐𝐸 − 𝑤𝑢𝐿𝑢 − 𝑤𝑠𝐿𝑠 − 𝑟𝐾, where 𝑝 is the market price for output 
𝑞, 𝑤𝑢 denotes the wage costs for unskilled labour, 𝑤𝑠 is the wage costs for skilled labour, and 𝑟 is the 
rental costs for capital. A firm will find it profitable to hire apprentices up to the point where the value of 
the marginal product (𝑉𝑀𝑃𝐸 = 𝑝 × 𝑀𝑃𝐸 = 𝑝 ×
𝜕𝑓(𝐸,𝐿𝑢,𝐿𝑠,𝐾)
𝜕𝐸
) is equal to the marginal costs (𝑐) of 
employing an additional apprentice (𝑉𝑀𝑃𝐸 =  𝑐).  
In the following paragraph, a firm’s benefits from employing an apprentice are discussed in more 
detail. Most production functions, for example, the Cobb–Douglas production function, assume that a 
firm’s output depends on the number of employees and capital, and some technology parameter. Such an 
assumption makes sense for regular employees, as output grows with employment. However, such a 
production function does not fully reflect the complexity of apprenticeship training, because a firm can 
choose many parameters, and is subject to several constraints that affect the productivity (and the costs) of 
apprenticeship training.  
Thus, estimating how a firm’s output changes when hiring an additional apprentice does not account 
for strategic choices regarding the amount of training and the allocation of productive tasks while 
apprentices are at the workplace.
4
 Unlike the case of unskilled or skilled workers, apprentices are not 
always working productively while they are at the workplace. More precisely, during the time ℎ𝑊 that 
apprentices spend at the workplace, the firm can decide on the fraction of time that apprentices perform 
skilled work 𝛼𝐸 and unskilled work 𝛽𝐸. Apprentices also spend a fraction of their time (𝜇𝐸 = 1 − 𝛼𝐸 −
𝛽𝐸) with activities that have no immediate value to the firm, either when receiving instruction at the 
workplace, or when carrying out simulations or exercises without the direct supervision of an apprentice 
instructor.
5
 Moreover, the firm invests ℎ𝑇 hours in apprenticeship training, and during that time apprentices 
also do not work productively, or only at a reduced pace, so that it will always be the case that apprentices 
spend a minimum fraction of their time at the workplace with unproductive tasks (i.e. ?̅?𝐸 > 0). The share 
of productive work also depends on the volume of suitable work that an apprentice can perform, which in 
turn depends on a firm’s production technology 𝜏 and on business conditions 𝑏 in a given training year. For 
example, some firms may be highly specialised and use automated production processes so that there are 
only few routine tasks available that a firm can allocate to inexperienced apprentices. Moreover, during a 
boom period, an apprentice’s share of productive tasks at the workplace is likely to be higher than during a 
recession. 
Some firms might provide better quality training than others, which is reflected by the parameter 𝜑, a 
measure of training quality/technology (which depends, e.g. on the teaching skills and experience of 
individual training instructors, or the quality of training facilities).
6
 In addition, the ability 𝜂 of an 
                                                     
4 For example, Mohrenweiser and Zwick (2009) estimate the value added of a marginal apprentice compared to that of an unskilled 
worker, and find heterogeneous effects across different occupations. Note that in equilibrium, the marginal productivity 
of an apprentice would be equal to marginal costs, so that marginal profits from hiring the last apprentice are zero 
(although average profits from training apprentices can be positive, as discussed below). 
5 Note that 𝜇𝐸 ≠ ℎ
𝑇 , as time spent practising (without the instructor) is not considered instruction time. Such a distinction is 
important, since newly learned skills can be applied while working productively or while performing exercises or 
simulations that are of no productive value to the firm.  
6 The costs for training quality are included in 𝑐𝑖
𝑜(𝜑). 
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individual apprentice positively affects productivity, since more able apprentices learn quicker and become 
more productive early on. Finally, experience in performing skilled tasks also influences productivity 
growth. Thus, apprentices who spend a larger fraction of their time carrying out unskilled tasks 𝛽𝐸 that do 
not require a vocational qualification in period 𝑖 will be less productive in skilled tasks later compared to 
apprentices who spend more time with skilled tasks (or time with appropriate exercises or simulations). 
Hence, the productivity of an apprentice in skilled tasks in period 𝑖 can be denoted as 
𝛾𝛼𝑖(ℎ𝑖−1
𝑇 (𝜃), 𝜑, 𝜂, 𝛽𝐸𝑖−1).  
As it is often very difficult to measure worker’s productivity, the concept to measure the costs and 
benefits of apprenticeship training using representative surveys is based on the opportunity costs principle. 
The advantage of such a measurement strategy is that there is no need to quantify the absolute value of the 
output. Instead, the benefit of having apprentices perform skilled work is reflected by how much a firm can 
save on wage payments because certain tasks do not need to be carried out by other (skilled or unskilled) 
workers. The value of an apprentice’s productive contribution 𝐵𝐸𝑖  to the firm in a particular training year 𝑖 
can be described as follows: 
𝐵𝐸𝑖 = ℎ𝑖
𝑊[𝛼𝐸𝑖(𝑏𝑖, 𝜏, 𝛾𝛼𝑖)𝛾𝛼𝑖(𝜑, ℎ𝑖−1
𝑇 (𝜃), 𝛽𝐸𝑖−1, 𝜂(𝑤𝐸 , 𝑤𝑠, 𝑤
𝐹))𝑤𝑠 + 𝛽𝐸𝑖(𝑏𝑖, 𝜏)𝑤𝑢]. 
Summing up, the firm’s benefit 𝐵𝐸𝑖  of having an apprentice in a particular year 𝑖 depends on the hours 
that an apprentice performs skilled work (ℎ𝑖
𝑊𝛼𝐸𝑖), multiplied with the relative productivity compared to a 
skilled worker (0 ≤ 𝛾𝛼 ≤ 1) and the skilled worker wage 𝑤𝑠, as well as on the hours of unskilled work 
(ℎ𝑖
𝑊𝛽𝐸𝑖) multiplied with the unskilled worker wage 𝑤𝑢. To illustrate, if it takes an apprentice twice as long 
to perform a certain skilled task compared to a skilled worker, then 𝛾𝛼 = 0.5, so that the value to the firm 
from having an apprentice perform one hour of skilled tasks is equal to 0.5𝑤𝑠, that is, the wage costs a firm 
can save from not having to employ (and pay) a skilled worker to perform that particular task.
7
 
Thus, the total value of employing an apprentice for an entire training period 𝑆 is given by8 
𝐵𝐸 = ∑ ℎ𝑖
𝑊 [𝛼𝐸𝑖(𝑏𝑖, 𝜏, 𝛾𝛼𝑖)𝛾𝛼𝑖(𝜑, ℎ𝑖−1
𝑇 (𝜃), 𝛽𝐸𝑖−1, 𝜂(𝑤𝐸 , 𝑤𝑠, 𝑤
𝐹))𝑤𝑠 + 𝛽𝐸𝑖(𝑏𝑖, 𝜏)𝑤𝑢]
𝑆
𝑖=1
. 
For a firm to hire at least one apprentice, 𝐵𝐸 must be sufficiently high to cover the costs 𝐶𝐸 =
∑ (𝑤𝐸𝑖 + ℎ𝑖
𝑇𝑤𝑠 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑜)𝑆𝑖=1  for apprentice wages and other training expenditures (although in theory, 
apprentice pay could be negative so that every firm would be willing to offer training positions).  
Finally, the total benefit of training 𝐸 apprentices can be denoted as 
𝑇𝐵𝐸 = 𝐸
𝜌 × ∑ ℎ𝑖
𝑊𝛼𝐸𝑖(𝑏𝑖, 𝜏, 𝛾𝛼𝑖)𝛾𝛼𝑖(𝜑, ℎ𝑖−1
𝑇 (𝜃), 𝛽𝐸𝑖−1, 𝜂(𝑤𝐸 , 𝑤𝑠, 𝑤
𝐹))𝑤𝑠 + 𝛽𝐸𝑖(𝑏𝑖, 𝜏)𝑤𝑢
𝑆
𝑖=1
, 
where 𝜌 < 1 implies a concave benefit structure (decreasing marginal training benefits). Total training 
costs are denoted as 
𝑇𝐶𝐸 = 𝐸
𝜎 × ∑ (𝑤𝐸𝑖 + ℎ𝑖
𝑇(𝜃)𝑤𝑠 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑜(𝜑))
𝑆
𝑖=1
, 
                                                     
7 For unskilled tasks, the model assumes that apprentices are equally productive compared to unskilled workers. 
8 For simplicity, that model assumes that the discount factor is zero. 
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where 𝜎 > 1 (𝜎 = 1) implies convex (constant) training costs. As previously discussed, a firm hires 
apprentices up to the point where the marginal training benefits are equal to the marginal training costs, 
which is given by 
𝜕𝑇𝐵𝐸
𝜕𝐸
=
𝜕𝑇𝐶𝐸
𝜕𝐸
,  
or 
𝜌𝐸𝜌−1𝐵𝐸 = 𝜎𝐸
𝜎−1𝐶𝐸 . 
The law of diminishing returns to scale implies 𝜌 < 1, yielding a downward sloping apprentice 
demand curve. Regarding the parameter 𝜎, its magnitude is ambiguous based on theoretical considerations. 
However, we could expect that firms can exploit economies of scale when instructing several apprentices 
at the same time. Conversely, we could also expect increasing marginal hiring (and possibly wage) costs 
for a firm to recruit suitable apprentices, because of a decreasing marginal ability (or match quality) of 
apprentices regarding a firm’s job requirements. Moreover, a firm faces capacity constraints, as it might 
have to invest in new training facilities or hire additional (full-time) training instructors when the number 
of apprentices exceeds a certain threshold. Currently, the available empirical evidence does not allow to 
draw a clear picture about the parameter 𝜎, mainly because of a lack of appropriate (panel) data. However, 
theoretical reasoning implies that the cost structure is unlikely to be concave across a wide range of 𝐸, 
suggesting that eventually 𝜎 ≥ 1. 9     
The above model implies that a firm’s demand for apprentices depends on the structure of both the 
costs and benefits of training, as  
𝐸 = (
𝜎𝐵𝐸
 𝜌𝐶𝐸
)
1
𝜎−𝜌
. 
Thus, as long as 𝜎 > 𝜌, which is the case if the benefit function is concave and the cost function is 
linear or exhibits a convex cost structure (or is less concave than the benefit function), the demand for 
apprentices depends positively on the cost–benefit ratio. In addition, the demand is negatively associated 
with the degree of concavity 𝜌 of the benefit function (i.e. by how much the additional benefit from hiring 
an additional apprentice decreases with the number of already hired apprentices), and negatively related to 
the degree of convexity of the cost function.
10
  
Examining the following costs and benefit function further reveals important insights into a firm’s 
demand for apprentices: 
𝐸 = (
𝜎 ∑ ℎ𝑖
𝑊 [𝛼𝐸𝑖(𝑏𝑖, 𝜏, 𝛾𝛼𝑖)𝛾𝛼𝑖(𝜑, ℎ𝑖−1
𝑇 (𝜃), 𝛽𝐸,𝑖−1, 𝜂(𝑤𝐸 , 𝑤𝑠, 𝑤
𝐹))𝑤𝑠 + 𝛽𝐸𝑖(𝑏𝑖, 𝜏)𝑤𝑢]
𝑆
𝑖=1
 𝜌 ∑ (𝑤𝐸𝑖 + ℎ𝑖
𝑇(𝑏𝑖, 𝜃)  × 𝑤𝑠 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑜(𝜑))𝑆𝑖=1
)
1
𝜎−𝜌
. 
 
                                                     
9 For example, Stevens (1994) or Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) assume convex training costs. The importance about assumptions 
regarding the cost and benefit structure relate to firm size; for example, in Germany and Switzerland, many (small) 
firms train only one apprentice at a time. Nonetheless, even though the share of large firms is rather small in both 
countries, the absolute number of apprentices trained in small firms with less than 10 employees is about equivalent to 
those trained in firms with more than 100 employees (Muehlemann & Wolter 2014). 
10 In the case where 𝜎 ≅ 𝜌, the demand for apprentices would converge towards infinity if 𝐵𝐸 > 𝐶𝐸 , and towards zero if 𝐵𝐸 < 𝐶𝐸. 
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Endogenous factors: Allocation of tasks and investment in apprenticeship instruction 
 
First, it is apparent that having apprentices perform a higher share of productive tasks at the 
workplace (𝛼𝐸 + 𝛽𝐸) increases the training benefit, and thus increases the number of apprenticeships 𝐸 
(ceteris paribus). A high share of skilled tasks 𝛼𝐸 increases training benefits even more when the relative 
productivity 𝛾𝛼𝑖 is high, while 𝛾𝛼𝑖 in turn depends positively on previous training investments ℎ𝑖−1
𝑇  and on 
apprentice ability 𝜂. However,  𝛾𝛼𝑖 depends negatively on the extent to which apprentices were used for 
unskilled tasks 𝛽𝐸𝑖−1 (rather than given the opportunity to apply newly learned skills in the production 
process, or by conducting appropriate simulations or exercises). In addition, the benefit from using 
apprentices in skilled work clearly increases with both skilled and unskilled worker wages 𝑤𝑠 and 𝑤𝑢, 
respectively. 
The marginal benefit from increasing the share of skilled work 𝛼𝐸𝑖 in a particular training year can be 
written as 
𝜕𝐵𝐸𝑖
𝜕𝛼𝐸𝑖
= ℎ𝑖
𝑊[𝛾𝛼𝑖(𝜑, ℎ𝑖−1
𝑇 (𝜃), 𝛽𝐸,𝑖−1, 𝜂(𝑤𝐸 , 𝑤𝑠, 𝑤
𝐹))𝑤𝑠] if 𝜇𝐸 > ?̅?𝐸  , as long as the firm can 
substitute unproductive time at the workplace with productive tasks. To illustrate, let us assume that the 
minimum training requirements are ℎ𝑇= 5 hours of weekly instruction time per apprentice, and that an 
apprentice spends a total of 25 hours at the workplace each week. Moreover, firm A has a separate training 
workshop with, let us say, a computer numerical control (CNC) machine that is exclusively used by 
apprentices to practice their newly acquired skills for another 20 hours, but the parts produced by 
apprentices on that machine are not sold to customers, as the production of those parts is of no direct value 
to the firm. Conversely, firm B uses apprentices directly in the production process for an additional 20 
hours where apprentices also get to apply their new skills by using CNC machines. Assuming that 
apprentices do not work productively while being instructed, the share of tasks with no direct value to firm 
A is 𝜇𝐸 = 100% (i.e. 25 hours per week), but 𝜇𝐸 = ?̅?𝐸 = 20% in firm B (i.e. 5 hours per week). Note that 
in this example the relative apprentice productivity 𝛾𝛼𝑖 is the same in firm A and firm B, as apprentices 
perform the same tasks on a CNC machine in both firms when they do not receive instruction. The training 
benefit in firm A, however, is clearly lower than in firm B, as long as 𝛾𝛼𝑖 > 0. The empirical evidence on 
how substituting non-productive activities with skilled tasks affects relative apprentice productivity is 
provided in section 3.6. 
Further, if a firm uses apprentices exclusively for productive work beyond the minimum time required 
for workplace instruction ?̅?𝐸, then increasing the share of skilled work comes at a cost ℎ𝑖
𝑊𝑤𝑢, which is the 
value of a marginal reduction in the share of unskilled work.
11
 There is, however, also a future benefit from 
decreasing 𝛽𝐸 in period 𝑖, because using apprentices mainly for unskilled tasks will negatively affect the 
relative productivity 𝛾𝛼 in period 𝑖 + 1, so that 
𝜕𝐵𝐸𝑖+1
𝜕𝛽𝐸𝑖
< 0. 
 Besides deciding on the allocation of skilled and unskilled tasks, a second important parameter that a 
firm can chose is the amount of training provided to apprentices. While there is a minimum level of 
training required in most countries with a dual apprenticeship system, a firm may find it beneficial to 
increase ℎ𝑖
𝑇 above the minimum threshold required by training regulations, particularly early on in the 
training period, because it increases future productivity in skilled tasks 𝛾𝑎,𝑖+1, thereby also increasing the 
training benefit by making it more beneficial for the firm to use apprentices in skilled, rather than unskilled 
tasks. However, as long as the firm has no intention to (or expects a low probability to successfully) retain 
apprentices as skilled workers after training, the optimal allocation of skilled and unskilled tasks solely 
depends on the corresponding benefits by the end of the apprenticeship period. As the relative productivity 
                                                     
11 Conversely, the marginal benefit from increasing the share of unskilled tasks will be reduced by ℎ𝑖
𝑊(𝛾𝛼𝑖𝑤𝑠) for firms that are no 
longer able to reduce the share of unproductive time at the workplace. 
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reaches full productivity only by the very end of the training programme, a firm may have incentives to 
allocate a high share of unskilled tasks, particularly if the difference between skilled and unskilled pay is 
small.
12
 In case a firm intends to employ former apprentices as skilled workers, it will however have strong 
incentives to allocate a high share of productive tasks to avoid future training costs (see below). 
Third, a firm can not only invest in the quantity, but also in the quality of training 𝜑, which in turn 
increases the productivity of apprentices in skilled tasks. Within a particular training occupation, examples 
of investments in training quality may include training courses for instructors, or state-of-the art training 
facilities and equipment (such as a 3D-printer for apprentices). Across occupations, both the quality and 
quantity of training also depend on training regulations (i.e. the amount of training that must be provided at 
the workplace), and whether skills are subject to external certification and quality control by external 
authorities.  
Consequently, if a firm decides to allocate skilled or unskilled work to apprentices with the aim to 
maximise training benefits, it will increase the share of productive work up to the point where 𝛼𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽𝐸𝑖 =
1 − ?̅?𝐸𝑖, so that 𝛽𝐸𝑖 = 1 − 𝛼𝐸𝑖 − ?̅?𝐸𝑖 in each training year. Moreover, as the relative productivity depends 
on past instruction time and experience in applying new skills, the firm needs to solve the following 
intertemporal maximisation problem regarding the optimal allocation of the share of skilled tasks, and the 
number of training hours ℎ𝑖−1
𝑇  and training quality 𝜑 in order to maximise profits:  
max𝐸,𝛼𝐸𝑖,ℎ𝑖
𝑇,𝜑   𝑇𝐵𝐸 − 𝑇𝐶𝐸 =
 𝐸𝜌 ∑ ℎ𝑖
𝑊𝛼𝐸𝑖(𝑏𝑖, 𝜏, 𝛾𝛼𝑖)𝛾𝛼𝑖(𝜑, ℎ𝑖−1
𝑇 (𝜃), 𝛽𝐸,𝑖−1, 𝜂(𝑤𝐸 , 𝑤𝑠, 𝑤
𝐹))𝑤𝑠 + (1 − 𝛼𝐸𝑖 − ?̅?𝐸𝑖)𝑤𝑢
𝑆
𝑖=1 −
𝐸𝜎 ∑ (𝑤𝐸𝑖 + ℎ𝑖
𝑇𝑤𝑠 + 𝑐𝑖
𝑜(𝜑))𝑆𝑖=1 . 
Assuming that wages are determined by market forces and that other expenditures (beyond 
investments in the training quality) depend on the training occupation, there are no further variables at the 
discretion of the firm.
13
 A discussion about the effects of monopsony power and the effects of the wage 
structure within the firm will be provided at the end of the next subsection. Yet, the next subsection first 
discusses the impact of certain variables on the cost and benefits of training that are not at the discretion of 
the firm, but are instead determined exogenously by training regulations, market environment, or a firm’s 
overall business strategy. 
Exogenous factors that impact the costs and benefits of training 
The main exogenous factors that impact the costs and benefits of training are not only the amount of 
time that apprentices actually spend at the workplace, business cycle fluctuations, and a firm’s production 
technology, but also the supply of potential apprentices and training regulations such as the duration of 
apprenticeship, and whether apprentices receive certificates that are recognised within the country.  
i. Time at the workplace ℎ𝑊 
The time at the workplace denotes the time at the discretion of the firm when apprentices are not away 
in vocational school, external courses, on vacation, or absent because of sickness. Clearly, having an 
                                                     
12 Simulations based on the cost–benefit surveys show a Swiss training firm could increase net benefits on average by EUR 22,000 
per apprentice when allocating solely unskilled tasks to apprentices (Wolter and Ryan, 2011). 
13 Apprentice ability may also depend on a firm’s recruitment effort. For simplicity and to some extent due to information 
asymmetries in the hiring process, apprentice ability is assumed exogenous to the firm (holding training and future 
wages constant). However, given that a demographic change and an increasing share of school-leavers make it more 
difficult for a firm to find suitable applicants for an apprenticeship position, investing more resources in the recruitment 
process to find an appropriate match might become an important issue.  
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apprentice at the workplace for a longer period increases the benefit to the firm from an apprentice’s 
productive work, but it may also come at a cost from having to provide additional workplace instruction. 
While the time in vocational school is typically determined by the national training curriculum, the 
organization of external courses (e.g. to acquire industry- or occupation-specific human capital) may be 
determined at the industry-level (e.g. by employer’s associations). Thus, the individual firm has very little 
influence, if any, on how much time an apprentice spends at the workplace in any given training year. 
ii. Business cycle fluctuations 𝑏 
The possibility to use apprentices for skilled work is negatively related to the business cycle 𝑏𝑖, 
because of a lower work volume in the firm. However, training costs also decrease if a firm can use 
instructors’ slack time for training (see, e.g. Brunello, 2009), so that instructing apprentices results in little 
extra costs, as instructors would not have worked productively during that time due to a low work volume 
in the firm. Thus, the net effect of business cycle fluctuations on a firm’s demand for apprentices is 
ambiguous. In particular, firms with an investment-oriented training motivation may not revise their 
training decision due to short-turn business cycle fluctuations. Section 3.6 provides some empirical 
evidence of business cycle effects on a firm’s training behaviour. 
iii. Production technology 𝜏   
The productive use of an apprentice also depends on a firm’s production technology 𝜏, which 
determines to what degree a firm can substitute apprentices for skilled and unskilled workers.
14
 For 
example, small and specialised firms may have limited opportunities to use apprentices in the production 
process. Moreover, as apprentices are required to be instructed on a wide set of occupational skills, some 
firms might not be able to provide a learning environment in the production process, thereby increasing the 
share of non-productive tasks 𝜇𝐸 (as apprentices need to rely on simulations or exercises to practice certain 
skills). Some firms also outsource part of the training activities away from the production process to 
internal or external training centres. While outsourcing may facilitate the exploitation of economies of 
scale by training several apprentices simultaneously, and sharing the fixed costs associated with the 
establishment of such centres by numerous apprentices, the drawback from the perspective of the firm is 
the missing (or at least lower) productive value when apprentices are away from the workplace (cf. 
Strupler and Wolter 2012; Muehlemann et al., 2007). 
iv. Supply (and ability) of apprentices 𝜂 
Another important factor to consider is the supply-side of the apprentice market, as the firm needs to 
attract a sufficient number of qualified candidates. Within a given training occupation or training field, 
apprentice supply (and also the average ability 𝜂 of potential apprentices) is an upward-sloping function 
that depends among other factors including apprentice pay, training quality, and expected future wages and 
career opportunities. First, a higher pay during the apprenticeship period (𝑤𝐸) directly and positively 
affects an individual’s rate of return to enrolling in an apprenticeship programme. Second, a higher training 
quality will increase future productivity and wages, and therefore further increase an individual’s rate of 
return due to apprenticeship training. To the extent that apprentice wages and skilled worker wages are 
determined by market forces, and training regulations determine the amount of skills provided at the 
workplace, the ability of potential apprentices to an individual firm can be regarded as exogenous. 
However, if a training firm can signal good training quality and future career opportunities (𝑤𝐹), it will be 
able to attract apprentices with an above-average ability.  
                                                     
14 While the firm can choose the production technology, it is assumed here than 𝜏 is exogenous with respect to the costs and 
benefits of apprenticeship training, as the provision of apprenticeship training is typically not a firm’s core business 
strategy. 
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v. Training duration S 
The training duration is an important factor regarding the costs and benefits of training. The training 
duration is specified ex-ante in a training contract, and depends on the amount of skills that are required to 
master the required tasks in a particular occupation.  
The optimal training duration should balance the interests of both the firm and apprentices. A training 
firm has an interest in a sufficiently long training duration to recoup its initial training investments as 
apprentices become more productive later in the training period. Put differently, the amount of training a 
firm is willing to invest increases with the training duration (Malcomson et al., 2003). Conversely, given 
that apprentice pay is usually set substantially below skilled worker’s pay, apprentices would like to get a 
skilled worker position as soon as they reach the productivity level of a skilled worker in the training 
occupation.  
Thus, while apprentices may potentially acquire all relevant formal skills within one year of extensive 
workplace instruction, there would be no time left for productive work, so that a firm would not be able to 
recoup its training investment. In the absence of post-training benefits, the instruction time should instead 
be spread out across the entire apprenticeship period, so that an apprentice reaches full productivity in 
skilled tasks around the same time when a firm can recoup its training investment. Moreover, the 
development of apprentice productivity not only requires workplace instruction, but also work experience 
in skilled tasks, so that apprentices can apply their newly acquired human capital.
15
 Thus, less skill-
intensive occupations require shorter apprenticeship duration.  
vi. External certification of skills and external quality control 𝜃 
While a firm has, to some extent, an incentive to invest in the skills of apprentices because a higher 
productivity in skilled task yields higher benefits from having an apprentice carry out skilled work, such 
incentives might not always be sufficient to provide high-quality training for the following reasons. First, if 
firm-specific and/or product-specific human capital is very important in a particular training firm, then a 
high relative productivity in skilled tasks is mainly beneficial for the training firm. Given that the training 
content is limited only to skilled tasks that are of interest to the training firm, future wages and 
employment prospects (𝑤𝐹) for graduated apprentices are lower in the absence of external certification of 
skills and external quality control. Thus, a training curriculum that requires the provision of sufficient 
general and occupation-specific skills is important so that a dual apprenticeship is attractive for high-ability 
school-leavers. 
Second, a missing external agency responsible for quality control might provide incentives for some 
training firms to maximise their (short-term) profits by providing only the skills that are relevant to the 
firm. Although reputation effects might limit the extent of low-quality training provision in a dynamic 
setting (cf. Wolter & Ryan 2011 for a discussion), potential apprentices are unlikely to have all the 
required information before the start of training to adequately assess the training quality in a particular 
firm. A possible consequence of low-quality training is a high dropout rate, possibly being a result of a 
lack of firm commitment, and thus low-quality training (Dustmann & Schönberg, 2012). Thus, external 
skill certification and quality control are important to ensure a high-quality training provision in 
apprenticeship programmes.
16
  
                                                     
15 Jansen and Pfeifer (2016) show that the relative productivity of German apprentices depends significantly on the share of skilled 
tasks allocated to apprentices at the workplace. 
16 In Germany, in addition to external monitoring agencies, works councils provide another type of quality control within the 
training firm, as works councils have the right to call for a replacement of training personnel if the training quality is 
unsatisfactory (see, e.g. Kriechel et al., 2014). 
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vii. Wage structure within the firm (𝑤𝐸 , 𝑤𝑢, 𝑤𝑠) 
First, as apprentice pay 𝑤𝐸 is an important determinant of total training costs, a decrease in apprentice 
pay will increase a firm’s demand for apprentices. However, apprentice pay also affects a firm’s supply of 
potential apprentices, as well as their average ability (as discussed in point iv above), which in turn affects 
the relative productivity of an apprentice in skilled tasks. Second, the effect of an increase in the wage for 
unskilled workers 𝑤𝑢 is straightforward: the use of apprentices in unskilled tasks 𝛽𝐸 becomes more 
beneficial for the firm, thereby increasing training benefits (and thus the demand for apprentices).
17
 
Finally, a raise in skilled worker pay 𝑤𝑠 has ambiguous effects: while higher skilled worker pay increases 
the benefit from allocating skilled tasks to apprentices, it also increases the costs for instruction time ℎ𝑊, 
as apprentice instructors are either skilled workers in the training occupation or full-time training 
instructors whose wage likely correlates strongly with the level of skilled worker pay in the firm. Thus, 
depending on the amount of training provided by the firm, as well as on the fraction of skilled work 𝛼𝐸 
allocated to apprentices, higher skilled worker pay can increase or decrease a firm’s demand for 
apprentices. However, an increase in skilled workers wages is likely to increase (decrease) the demand for 
apprentices 𝐸 if training hours are low (high), and the share of skilled work allocated to apprentices is high 
(low), ceteris paribus.  
In some training occupations, or even entire countries, the equilibrium outcome may require a very 
low apprentice pay for firms to be interested in offering apprenticeships in addition to bearing the required 
training expenditures. Figure 1 shows that the introduction of a minimum apprentice pay above the 
equilibrium level, or minimum training standards regarding the amount of human capital that a firm must 
provide at the workplace, may lead to a situation with an excess demand for apprenticeship positions 
(?̅?𝑆– ?̅?𝐷). Therefore, a firm will hire fewer (if any) apprentices in the case when training costs substantially 
exceed the market-clearing level if it considers only the training period to generate sufficient benefits to 
cover the training costs. 
While a very low apprentice pay may not be problematic for young individuals as long as the 
expected future wage and employment opportunities after completing apprenticeship training are 
sufficiently high to cover the short-term costs (i.e. earning losses from unskilled work during the training 
period), the situation might be different for older workers. First, the payoff period when apprenticeship 
graduates earn a skilled worker wage rather than an unskilled worker wage is shorter for older workers (as 
fewer years are left until retirement), thereby lowering the individual rate of return to the investment in 
apprenticeship training. Second, older individuals often have more financial responsibilities (housing, 
family obligations, etc.), and credit constraints may prohibit the participation in apprenticeship training 
even if the return on investment were positive.  
                                                     
17 The ratio of apprentice pay to unskilled pay (𝑤𝐸/𝑤𝑢) varies greatly across countries. While Dustmann and Schönberg (2012) 
report a ratio of 0.9 for the UK, the corresponding ratio for Germany is 0.44. It is obvious that a very high relative 
apprentice pay, such as in the UK, leaves little room for firms to recoup training investments by having apprentices 
perform unskilled work. 
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Figure 1: Market for apprentices – the effect of minimum training costs for apprentices
18
 
 
Recent research in labour economics (e.g. Manning, 2011) suggests that there are important 
imperfections in modern labour markets, which can be well described by the theory of monopsonistic 
labour markets. The main difference between monopsonistic and perfect labour markets is that firms no 
longer need to pay market wages, but rather face an upward-sloping labour supply curve. Thus, firms can 
essentially set wages. The reasons for monopsony power are, among others, mobility and search costs of 
individuals, as well as information asymmetries between firms and employees regarding the ability or 
individual characteristics that are relevant to a job, and information asymmetries between firms about the 
amount and type of human capital that apprentices accumulate (see Manning, 2011 or Muehlemann et al., 
2013 for recent surveys of the relevant literature). 
Given that apprentices in the same occupation usually earn the same salary (within the training firm), 
monopsonistic labour markets imply that the marginal wage costs to hire an additional apprentice are not 
just reflected in the wage costs for the marginal hire, but also in the increase in apprentice pay for all 
previously hired apprentices. For example, let us assume that a firm can hire two apprentices at EUR 500 
per month, and three apprentices at EUR 600 per month (plus training expenditures), then the marginal 
costs to hire the third apprentice are not just EUR 600 per month, but also the extra EUR 100 per month 
that need to be paid to the other two apprentices. Hence, the marginal costs for the third apprentice are 
EUR 800 per month (plus training expenditures), and the marginal training costs (𝑀𝐶𝐸) are an increasing 
function of the number of apprentices when a training firm has monopsony power, with a slope that is 
steeper than the supply curve. Figure 2 shows that the equilibrium outcome of monopsony power in the 
apprenticeship market regarding the number of apprenticeship contracts: while equilibrium employment 
and costs in the competitive case are (𝐸∗, 𝑐∗), monopsonistic training firms will hire fewer apprentices 
(𝐸𝑀1) at lower costs (𝑐𝑀1). 
                                                     
18 In Figure 1, it is assumed that the marginal training costs are constant and that a firm can hire as many apprentices as desired at 
the going market wage (𝜎 = 1). Moreover, the negative slope of the 𝑉𝑀𝑃𝐸 function is based on the assumption of a 
diminishing marginal product of apprentices (i.e. a concave production function with 𝜌 < 1). 
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Figure 2: Market for apprentices when firms have monopsony power
19
 
 
However, a firm may not only have monopsony power over apprentices, but also over skilled 
workers. Thus, post-training benefits arise due to savings on future hiring costs, or because a firm can 
select and retain more productive individuals while not having to pay above-market wages. The additional 
post-training benefit will then be reflected in a shift of the firm’s demand curve for apprentices to the right 
(𝑉𝑀𝑃𝐸
𝑇). The equilibrium outcome (𝐸𝑀2, 𝑐𝑀2) therefore describes a situation where a firm has monopsony 
power in both the apprenticeship and skilled labour markets. Obviously, the extent of how much 
monopsony power affects the equilibrium levels of apprenticeship contracts and training costs is an 
empirical question. However, in theory, monopsony power has two opposing effects on a firm’s demand 
for apprentices: while monopsony power in the apprenticeship market tends to reduce apprentice wages 
and the number of apprenticeship positions, monopsony power in the market for skilled workers has an 
opposing effect – increasing both the equilibrium number of apprenticeship contracts and training costs 
(Figure 2). Depending on the relative importance of monopsony power over apprentices and skilled 
workers (Muehlemann et al., 2013), the equilibrium number of apprenticeship positions may be close to a 
situation where firms have no monopsony power at all and consider only short-run training benefits (i.e. as 
long as the labour demand curve exhibits a sufficiently large shift to the right due to large expected post-
training benefits). 
The next subsection provides a detailed discussion of the determinants of (expected) post-training 
benefits for training firms.  
Post-training benefits 
A firm may be able to generate post-training benefits by retaining graduated apprentices as skilled 
workers. Post-training benefits mainly arise due to an increased match quality, saved future hiring and 
firing costs, and a possible rent that a firm can generate by paying former apprentices a wage that is lower 
than the marginal value product. Thus, the total benefits from training an apprentice can be described as 
follows: 
                                                     
19 In Figure 2, it is assumed that the marginal training costs are convex (𝜎 > 1) due to monopsony power, in contrast to Figure 1, 
where the marginal training costs are constant.  
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𝑁𝐵𝐸
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 𝑇𝐵𝐸 − 𝑇𝐶𝐸 + 𝑝𝑟[𝐵𝐸
𝑃𝑇], 
where 𝑝𝑟 = 𝑓(𝑤𝑠𝐸 − 𝑤𝑠, 𝑤
𝐹 , 𝑣(𝐼, 𝑏), 𝐿𝑠(𝑆+1), 𝜂, 𝛾𝑎𝑆) denotes the (expected) retention probability of 
apprenticeship graduates.  
From the perspective of an apprentice, the willingness to remain with the training firm and to accept a 
job as a skilled worker depends on the difference between the post-training skilled worker wage in the 
training firm 𝑤𝑠𝐸 and the going wage rate for skilled workers in the external labour market 𝑤𝑠 (i.e. 
Δ𝑤 = 𝑤𝑠𝐸 − 𝑤𝑠), expected career opportunities in the training firm 𝑤
𝐹 , as well as the number of external 
vacancies 𝑣 (outside options) in the labour market. In times of a tight labour market (due to business cycle 
fluctuations 𝑏), search costs may reduce the probability of finding the appropriate job offer. In turn, the 
number of vacancies depends on labour market institutions 𝐼; for example, strict employment protection 
legislation may reduce the overall number of vacancies in a (national) labour market, and business cycle 
conditions at the time of graduation. 
From the perspective of a firm, the willingness to retain a graduated apprentice as a skilled worker 
depends on the firm’s future demand for skilled workers 𝐿𝑠(𝑆+1), the overall ability of the apprentices 𝜂 
(which may only be observable to the firm by the end of training), and the relative productivity of the 
apprentice in skilled tasks by the end of training 𝛾𝑎𝑆. Thus, the relative productivity of an apprentice in 
firms that offer poor training conditions might be substantially below the productivity of a skilled worker 
available in the external labour market (i.e. 𝛾𝑎𝑆 ≪ 1). Conversely, a firm that anticipates retaining a high 
share of apprentices after training may have an incentive to invest beyond the minimum training 
requirements (ℎ𝑖
𝑇 >> ℎ𝑖
𝑇𝑚𝑖𝑛 ), so that apprentices are equally productive compared to other skilled workers 
in the firm by the end of the apprenticeship. The incentives for doing so are clear, because the firm’s 
opportunity costs to providing training are considerably lower for apprentices compared to newly hired 
skilled workers, as 𝑤𝐸 < 𝑤𝑠.  
More specifically, post-training benefits can be written as 
 
𝐵𝐸
𝑃𝑇 = 𝐻 (𝛾𝑎𝑆 (∑ ℎ𝑖
𝑇
𝑆
𝑖=1
, 𝜂, 𝛽𝐸𝑖) , 𝜏,
𝑤𝑠𝐸
𝑤𝑠
) + 𝐹(𝐼) + [(𝑉𝑀𝑃𝑠𝐸 − 𝑤𝑠𝐸) − (𝑉𝑀𝑃𝑠 − 𝑤𝑠)], 
 
 where 𝐻 denotes the hiring costs for externally recruited skilled workers, 𝐹 denotes the firing 
costs, 𝑉𝑀𝑃𝑠𝐸 is the marginal value product of a skilled worker that was previously an apprentice with the 
training firm, whereas 𝑉𝑀𝑃𝑠 corresponds to an externally hired skilled worker. 
 
i. Hiring costs 𝐻 
A potentially important component of post-training benefits are savings on future hiring costs if an 
apprentice reaches a high relative productivity in skilled task (𝛾𝑎𝑆 ≅ 1) by the end of training, which in 
turn positively depends on the total amount of training hours and an apprentice’s innate ability (which is 
revealed to the firm by the end of the apprenticeship), but negatively depends on the apprentice’s time used 
for unskilled tasks (i.e. time not spend with learning or applying skilled tasks). Moreover, the savings on 
hiring costs depend on the firm’s production process 𝜏; thus, retaining apprentices might be particularly 
beneficial if firm- or product-specific human capital is important (as this would result in higher training 
costs for externally recruited workers, whereas apprentices acquire such skills during the apprenticeship 
 EDU/WKP(2016)17 
 23 
period). While high-wage firms may find it easier to attract qualified skilled workers, the personnel costs 
of the search and selection process are also higher in high-wage firms (Blatter et al., 2012), leading to an 
ambiguous effect of relative wages (
𝑤𝑠𝐸
𝑤𝑠
) on hiring costs. Finally, hiring costs are positively associated 
with the skill requirements in a particular occupation beyond a firm’s production technology, because it 
becomes more difficult – and thus more expensive – to find suitable job applicants when skill requirements 
are high (see also Muehlemann and Strupler Leiser, 2015). 
ii. Firing costs 𝐹 
Firing costs 𝐹 largely depend on labour market institutions 𝐼. While firms face relatively low firing 
costs in countries with little employment protection legislation, there will always be some administrative 
costs to lay off a worker. Moreover, once workers receive the layoff notice, the motivation to put in effort 
during the remainder of the time with the firm may decrease, so that the productivity of the employee is 
likely to be lower during the notice period (yet the duration of the notice period again depends on labour 
market institutions). When information asymmetries are important, then apprenticeship training becomes 
an important screening tool for employers to uncover the true ability and motivation of an individual, a 
process that can take several years (Lange, 2007). Thus, the advantage of apprenticeship training is to 
reduce information asymmetries between the training firm and apprentices, so that the firm can determine 
more accurately whether a particular individual is a good match (Muehlemann et al., 2010). Accordingly, 
the firm is willing to make net investments in training, as it can reduce the number of future layoffs, and 
save the corresponding firing and hiring costs to refill the vacancy.  
iii. Compressed wage structures 
A third main component of post-training benefits are compressed wage structures (e.g. Acemoglu and 
Pischke, 1998, 1999). Owing to information asymmetries, the training firm has an information advantage 
about the true ability of (former) apprentices. Moreover, even in the case when training is certified, the 
training firm may have superior knowledge about the exact content of training compared to outside firms. 
Additionally, frictions in the labour market, such as mobility costs, reduce the number of job offers 
(vacancies) for graduated apprentices. Therefore, the training firm is able to retain the abler apprentices, 
while the less able ones need to find a new employer. However, while other firms cannot observe the 
ability of individual apprenticeship graduates, they are aware that training firms retain the ablest 
apprentices, so that the expected ability of graduated apprentices in the labour market will be of below-
average productivity. Thus, the going wage rate in the external labour market will adjust accordingly, and 
even the most able apprentices will stay with the training firm and accept a wage that is lower than their 
productivity, as long as the wage offered by the training firms exceeds the wage in the external labour 
market (i.e. 𝑉𝑀𝑃𝑠𝐸 > 𝑤𝑠𝐸 > 𝑤𝑠). Summing up, a firm can generate post-training benefits from 
apprenticeship training, as long as the difference between the wage and the productivity is larger for former 
apprentices compared to workers that are hired from the external labour market. 
Cost-elasticity of firm’s demand for apprentices and expected effects of subsidy schemes 
The basic concept of the apprenticeship market is useful to make predictions regarding several 
potential policy questions. An important factor is the cost-elasticity of a firm’s demand for apprentices (i.e. 
a measure that shows how a firm’s demand reacts to a change in training costs). Similar to the textbook 
case of a firm’s demand for labour (i.e. the own-wage elasticity of labour demand), the Hicks–Marshall 
laws of derived demand also directly apply to the firm’s demand for apprentices (see, e.g. Ehrenberg & 
Smith 2015): 
i. The demand for apprentices is more elastic when the elasticity of substitution between 
production factors is higher. 
EDU/WKP(2016)17 
 24 
When apprentices are close substitutes for both skilled and unskilled workers, then the changes in 
relative wages are likely to affect a firm’s demand for apprentices more strongly compared to a situation 
where the elasticity of substitution is low.
20
 For example, let us assume that apprentices perform both 
skilled and unskilled work during the training period. An increase in the apprentice wage (ceteris paribus) 
would make the use of apprentices more expensive relative to skilled and unskilled labour, and thus the 
firm may want to substitute skilled and unskilled workers for apprentices. 
Conversely, an increase in the minimum wage of unskilled workers would make the use of 
apprentices (ceteris paribus) in the production process more beneficial for firms, so that they would want to 
substitute apprentices for unskilled workers. Thus, as long as apprentices are close substitutes for unskilled 
workers, a relative increase in apprentice pay compared to unskilled pay would have a strong effect on 
apprentice demand in firms, occupations, or apprenticeship systems (such as in Switzerland) where the 
share of unskilled work 𝛽𝐸 allocated to apprentices is high. 
ii. The demand for apprentices is more elastic when the elasticity of demand on the product 
market is higher. 
An increase in training costs (ceteris paribus) increases production costs. If the elasticity of demand 
on the product market is very high (i.e. the product market is competitive), then a small increase in 
production costs would result in a significant drop in sales. Consequently, a firm would need to reduce 
production when producing at higher costs, and therefore decrease the demand for apprentices. Conversely, 
if customers do not react strongly to small price changes, then an increase in training costs (that goes along 
with an increase in the product price) would have a small effect on a firm’s demand for apprentices, 
because sales would be hardly affected by the change in training costs. However, firms operating in 
competitive industries may also require a more skilled workforce, thus competition per se does not prevent 
firms from training their workers. Bassanini and Brunello (2011) find that the deregulation in some 
industries in the European Union increased the training participation of firms. Nonetheless, holding skill 
requirements constant, we would still expect that firms in competitive industries react stronger to changes 
in training costs. 
iii. The demand for apprentices is more elastic when the supply of other factors of production is 
highly elastic. 
A firm’s ability to substitute (e.g. skilled workers for apprentices) may become increasingly difficult 
depending on whether skilled workers are readily available in the labour market. Thus, while it may be 
relatively easy for a firm to find one full-time skilled worker to replace the amount of skilled work 
performed by apprentices, hiring many skilled workers simultaneously may become more difficult and thus 
more expensive if skilled workers are hard to find in the external labour market. 
iv. The demand for apprentices is more elastic when the total net costs of apprenticeship training 
are a larger share of total production costs. 
The extent of how strongly an increase in apprentice pay affects a firm’s demand for apprentices also 
depends on the total number of apprentices, and on the capital-intensity of a firm’s production process. 
Thus, if a firm employs a high share of apprentices (relative to total employment) and has a labour-
intensive production technology, then an increase in apprentice pay affects total production costs relatively 
                                                     
20 Fougère and Schwerdt (2001) calculate substitution elasticities of apprentices for skilled and unskilled workers for France and 
Germany based on the Cobb–Douglas production functions. They find an elasticity of substitution close to unity for 
small and medium-sized German firms, and mixed results for large firms with more than  
200 employees. However, not all estimates are statistically significant. 
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more compared to a firm that hires fewer apprentices and generally uses a more capital-intensive 
production process.  
The cost-elasticity of demand for apprentices is also an important factor to consider by governments 
when deciding on potential subsidy schemes. If the firm’s demand for apprentices is relatively inelastic, 
subsidies (i.e. a reduction in training costs) would not have a strong effect on the provision of 
apprenticeships. Conversely, an elastic demand for apprentices would react strongly to financial incentives 
(or the introduction of minimum apprentice pay). The main issue regarding the provision of subsidies in 
dual apprenticeship programmes is that there is not much empirical evidence regarding their effectiveness, 
and equally important – regarding their cost-effectiveness (see Muehlemann and Wolter (2013) for a 
discussion of this issue). While subsidies could encourage firms to take on apprentices, governments 
should also consider the costs of alternative options in the education system (e.g. per student costs of other 
full-time schooling programmes). However, based on the above analysis, it can be concluded that a firm’s 
demand for apprentices would react more strongly to financial incentives if apprentices are close 
substitutes for skilled and unskilled workers, and the competition in the product market is high.  
Subsidies could also distort incentives when apprentices are close substitutes for unskilled workers. In 
that case, a firm would have an incentive to hire as many apprentices as possible as substitutes for 
unskilled workers, and then exploit the apprentices by having them perform mainly unskilled work (while 
providing low-quality training). Thus, providing training subsidies should go along with regulations 
concerning the quantity and quality of training, but also with monitoring and enforcement of the firm´s 
actual training behaviour (Muehlemann and Wolter, 2013).  
However, providing subsidies to training firms only affects the demand for apprentices. Thus, an 
alternative approach is to increase the supply of suitable apprentices in training markets where there is 
currently a lack of apprenticeship training. While apprenticeship training is seen as a viable career path in 
countries such as Germany or Switzerland, entering an apprenticeship is not the preferred career choice in 
many countries with an established academic education system. Therefore, while it is important to 
convince firms of the benefits of apprenticeship training, it is equally important to convince potential 
apprentices (and their parents) that apprenticeships may offer successful careers, as this affects the supply 
of potential apprenticeship candidates.  
 A major disadvantage of training subsidies targeted at individual firms is the administrative costs 
associated with the redistribution of funds from non-training firms to training firms. Such adverse effects 
are particularly pronounced if training funds are managed regionally and across all sectors. More cost-
efficient options can be found at the sectoral level, if transfers from non-training to training firms are 
handled by employer’s associations. For example, all firms pay their membership fees, and part of those 
fees could be used for industry-specific training courses for apprentices. In such a scheme, apprentices 
from all training firms spend some time (ranging from a few days to several weeks, depending on the skill 
requirements) at the beginning of an apprenticeship, in such external courses where they are instructed on 
industry- or occupation-specific skills that are relevant for all apprentices. Moreover, governments might 
pay part of such costs, as is the case in Switzerland (see also SERI, 2015). An advantage of sectoral 
agreements is that the heterogeneity in training costs, apprentice supply, and the availability of skilled 
workers with the corresponding vocational qualification in the external labour market can be considered by 
focusing on sectors with an excess supply of apprentices.  
  Related to the discussion of the cost structure of apprenticeship training, the design of potential 
subsidy schemes matters as well. While in practice, subsidies may take the form of a lump-sum transfer, 
such subsidies largely encourage those firms to participate in training that decided to do so because of high 
fixed-training costs. Conversely, profit-maximising firms train apprentices and hire up to a point where 
marginal training benefits equal marginal training costs. As lump-sum payments do not affect a firm’s 
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decision at the margin, such subsidies merely increase its training benefit, but the number of training places 
remains unaffected.
21
 Thus, such subsidies would only be optimal in countries with a very low share of 
training firms, and where fixed costs are the main reason for many firms to not engage in training. 
Otherwise, there are large windfall gains associated with such schemes, as many training firms would have 
offered the same number of training positions even in the absence of lump-sum subsidies. Thus, to affect 
the demand for apprentices for all firms, subsidies should be linked to the actual number of apprentices. 
The empirical evidence on how financial incentives affect a firm’s training behaviour is provided in section 
3.3. 
Some challenges in measuring costs and benefits 
The organization of apprenticeship training takes different forms. While many firms train according to 
the ‘classical’ dual system, where an apprentice works closely with training instructors and is integrated 
into the regular work process, other firms – particularly large firms – have separate training facilities. 
Moreover, large firms may have a separate human resource department that manages the recruitment and 
selection processes, and makes the decision whether to retain an apprentice after the training. To account 
for such differences, the Swiss cost–benefit survey use different questionnaires for small and large firms. 
In large firms, a first questionnaire is addressed to the corresponding individuals who are in charge of 
human resources, whereas a second questionnaire is addressed to those individuals who are directly 
instructing the apprentice daily. Firms with separate training centres are asked about the costs of training 
centres, as well as the value of the productive contribution of apprentices in such centres.  
While the training costs are rather straightforward to measure, quantifying the training benefit is more 
challenging. In particular, it remains a challenge in empirical research to measure the value of the 
productivity of employees. Therefore, the German and Swiss cost–benefit surveys do not attempt to 
directly measure the productivity of an apprentice. Instead, the aim of the survey is to obtain a measure of 
the apprentice’s production value compared to that of a skilled worker or an unskilled worker. Thus, rather 
than estimating the (absolute) productivity of an apprentice during an hour of skilled work, the training 
instructors are asked to give an estimate of an apprentice’s productivity relative to the productivity of a 
skilled worker in the firm, as discussed above. The main advantage of this approach is that there is no need 
to measure the actual productivity of apprentices or skilled workers. In case that the firm does not pay 
skilled workers a wage that is equal to the productivity, the firm still makes the same amount of profit 
when the apprentice executes skilled tasks, but depending on training costs, the firm might make an 
additional profit from having an apprentice carry out the tasks rather than the skilled worker. Thus, the 
survey essentially compares the situation for with or without having offering apprenticeship training.  
2.2. Empirical evidence 
 
This section provides the empirical evidence on the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training from 
a firm’s perspective based on the most recent surveys from different countries, as well as data on 
apprentice retention rates and a firm’s potential savings from not having to hire skilled workers from the 
external labour market. A more detailed analysis of the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training by 
different factors, such as firm size, occupation, financial incentives, or training duration will be provided in 
section 3. 
                                                     
21 Suppose that the total net training costs take the form 𝑇𝐶 = 𝑎𝐸, where 𝐸 denotes the number of apprentices. A lump-sum 
subsidy S for firms reduces total the training costs, so that 𝑇𝐶 = 𝑎𝐸 − 𝑆. However, the marginal training costs remain 
unaffected for firms with E>0, as 𝑐 =
𝜕𝑇𝐶
𝜕𝐸
= 𝑎, so that the lump-sum subsidies only create financial incentives for 
firms that previously did not train any apprentices. Conversely, if subsidies depend on the number of apprentices, then 
𝑇𝐶´ = 𝑎𝐸 − 𝐸𝑆, and 𝑐´ =  𝑎 − 𝑆, so that training firms would also offer additional apprenticeship positions. 
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Costs and benefits of apprenticeship training 
 
The empirical evidence on the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training is rather limited. So far, 
large-scale and representative surveys on the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training were only 
conducted in Germany and Switzerland. While Germany started their first surveys in the 1970s 
(Sachverständigenkommission Kosten und Finanzierung der beruflichen Bildung, 1974), the first Swiss 
survey was conducted in the year 2000 (Schweri et al., 2003). The latest German survey was conducted in 
2012/13 (Jansen et al., 2015a), whereas the latest Swiss survey was conducted in 2009 (Strupler and 
Wolter, 2012).  
Table 3: Costs and benefits of apprenticeship training in Germany and Switzerland, per apprentice and 
training year 
Costs and benefits of apprenticeship training 
Germany 
(mean) 
Switzerland 
(mean) 
Costs 17,933 26,179 
Benefits 12,535 28,496 
Net costs 5398 -2316 
Year of survey 2012/13 2009 
Observations 3032 2518 
Note: Costs and benefits in EUR, conversion based on CHF/EUR exchange rate of 1.10 (on 11 Sept. 2015).  
Source: Adapted from Jansen et al. (2015a), Apprenticeship training in Germany remains investment-focused – results of 
BIBB Cost-Benefit Survey 2012/13, BIBB Report 1/2015, and Strupler and Wolter (2012), Die duale Lehre eine 
Erfolgsgeschichte - auch für Betriebe. Ergebnisse der dritten Kosten-Nutzen-Erhebung der Lehrlingsausbildung aus der Sicht 
der Betriebe, Glarus/Chur: Rüegger Verlag. 
 
Table 3 shows the average training costs, benefits, and net costs for Germany and Switzerland. The 
difference in net costs between the two countries is striking: while a German firm on average makes a net 
investment of EUR 5 400 per year per apprentice, the average Swiss firm generates a net benefit of EUR 2 
300 per year per apprentice. Thus, in Germany, the productive contribution of apprentices covers on 
average about 70% of the firm’s training investment, while the work of an average Swiss apprentice covers 
all of the firm’s training costs. However, the variance in net costs (benefits) is rather large. In Germany, 
about 30% of apprenticeships result in net benefits from the firm’s perspective, while the corresponding 
figure for Switzerland is 71%.  
The evidence for other countries is rather limited. An older study from Austria based on a survey in 
1995 (Lassnigg and Steiner, 1997) showed that about 35% of Austrian firms could generate a net benefit 
from training apprentices (based on the ‘equivalence method’). Moreover, based on interviews in 42 firms 
in five sectors in the UK, Gambin et al. (2010) find that firms make a considerable net investment when 
taking on apprentices. Gambin et al. (2010) also report that most training firms can break even when 
subsequently retaining their apprentices as skilled workers for one to three years. Finally, for Australia, 
Dockery et al. (1997) report considerable net training costs of AUD 22 000, although the data refer only to 
59 firms in traditional trades. 
More recently, Wolter and Muehlemann (2015) simulated the hypothetical costs and benefits of 
apprenticeship training for the case that Spanish firms were to start dual apprenticeships similar to 
Switzerland or Germany. The simulations show that there would be at least one scenario for each of the 
analysed occupations so that training firms could reach the break-even point by the end of the training 
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period (i.e. without having to rely on post-training benefits). The main factors affecting the cost–benefit 
ratio for the firm are apprentice pay, time spent in vocational school, and the training duration, ensuring 
that a firm has enough time to recoup the training investment. 
Long-run training benefits: saved future hiring costs 
One of the most important potential post-training benefits is that a training firm can save on future 
hiring costs when retaining former apprentices as skilled workers. In the cost–benefit surveys, both 
German and Swiss firms were asked to report their recruitment and training expenditures to fill a vacancy 
for a skilled worker position. Muehlemann and Strupler Leiser (2015) classify hiring costs by three main 
components: (1) search costs; (2) adaptation costs; and (3) disruption costs. Search costs include 
expenditures on job advertisements and interview costs, while adaptation costs include formal training 
expenditures and the costs associated with initially low productivity during the adaptation period (until a 
worker reaches full productivity). Finally, disruption costs measure informal training expenditures, as new 
hires require instruction from other workers in the firm, thereby distracting them from their regular work 
duties. 
Table 4: Average hiring costs for skilled workers in Germany (in EUR), 2012/13 
Employees < 10   in %  10-49  in % 50-499   in % 500+   in % All firms  in % 
Search costs 527 7% 1622 15% 1832 15% 3233 20% 928 11% 
Adaptation costs 3538 47% 3905 37% 4191 35% 5127 31% 3689 42% 
Disruption costs 3540 47% 4945 47% 5798 49% 8098 49% 4097 47% 
Total 7605 100% 10472 100% 11821 100% 16458 100% 8714 100% 
Source: Adapted from Jansen et al. (2015a), Apprenticeship training in Germany remains investment-focused – results of BIBB Cost-
Benefit Survey 2012/13, BIBB Report 1/2015. 
In Germany, hiring costs amount on average to EUR 8 700 to successfully fill a vacancy, and consist 
mainly of disruption and adaptation costs, as search costs only account for 11% of the total hiring costs 
(Table 4). Hiring costs increase strongly with firm size, and large firms spend more than twice as much to 
fill a vacancy compared to the smallest firms. Moreover, search costs become more important for larger 
firms relative to adaptation costs. Nonetheless, the share of disruption costs remains constant at almost 
50% across all firm-size categories. 
Table 5: Average hiring costs for skilled workers in Switzerland (in EUR), 2009 
Employees < 50  in % 50+  in % All firms in % 
Search costs 3395 20% 6483 25% 3992 21% 
Adaptation costs 9110 53% 14,039 54% 10,063 53% 
Disruption costs 4585 27% 5719 22% 4805 25% 
Total 17,090 100% 26,241 100% 18,859 100% 
Note: CHF/EUR exchange rate of 1.10 on 11 September 2015.  
Source: Adapted from Muehlemann and Strupler Leiser (2015), The facts you need to know about hiring. IZA , Discussion Paper No. 
9363,  http://ftp.iza.org/dp9363.pdf (accessed 7 March 2016). 
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For Switzerland, the average hiring costs are just below EUR 19 000 (Table 5). Similar to German 
firms, search costs constitute the smallest fraction of total hiring costs, and even their share is twice as high 
compared to Germany. Moreover, hiring costs also increase with firm size, although the difference is not as 
pronounced compared to Germany. 
Table 6: Average retention rate of apprentices in Germany (in %), 2012/13 
Retention rate by firm size, 2012/13   (in %) 
  Total 59.0    
  <10 employees 49.0    
  10-49 employees 65.0    
  50-499 employees 75.0    
  500+ employees 82.0    
Source: Adapted from Jansen et al. (2015a), Apprenticeship training in Germany remains investment-focused – results of BIBB Cost-
Benefit Survey 2012/13, BIBB Report 1/2015. 
Even though the average hiring costs in Germany are smaller than the average net investment, large 
firms can – on average – save EUR 16 500 on hiring costs by retaining a former apprentice, which could 
cover the average net investment of a 3-year apprenticeship. Moreover, retention rates are highest in large 
firms (Table 6), implying that large firms are frequently able to reap the benefits from saving future hiring 
costs. 
Table 7: Average retention rate of apprentices in Switzerland (in %), 2009 
Retention rate by firm size, 2012/13   (in %) 
  Total 35.5    
  <5 employees 22.6    
  5-9 employees 26.7    
  10-49 employees 32.1    
  50-249 employees 43.0 
  250+ employees 47.8    
Source: Adapted from Strupler and Wolter (2012), Die duale Lehre eine Erfolgsgeschichte - auch für Betriebe. Ergebnisse der dritten 
Kosten-Nutzen-Erhebung der Lehrlingsausbildung aus der Sicht der Betriebe, Glarus/Chur: Rüegger Verlag. 
In Switzerland, hiring costs are considerably higher in monetary terms. However, as most hiring costs 
depend on wages, this difference is largely due to the higher overall wage level in Switzerland. In both 
countries, the average hiring costs are equivalent to about 3-4 months of skilled worker pay. However, as 
70% of Swiss firms already generate a net benefit from training apprentices, these firms do not require to 
retain apprentices as skilled workers to recoup the initial training investment. The relatively low retention 
rates at the firm level in Switzerland (35.5% compared to 59.0% on average in Germany) are associated 
with the overall higher mobility in the labour market (Table 7). Thus, an average Swiss training firm must 
recoup its training investment by the end of the apprenticeship, because the post-training turnover rates are 
high. Breaking even is particularly relevant for small firms that often only train one apprentice at a time. 
Suppose that a small firm trains a single apprentice for four years, but then the apprentice unexpectedly 
leaves the training firm, then it would take at least another four years (and eight years in total) to fill a 
vacancy by means of apprenticeship training. Thus, particularly for small firms, it is important to be able to 
provide training without having to make a substantial net investment when labour market mobility is high. 
Moreover, when most human capital is general, or at least occupation- or industry-specific, then small 
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firms in a particular industry will find it easier – and thus also cheaper – to recruit qualified and suitable 
skilled workers from the external labour market, as long as there is a sufficient number of firms offering 
apprenticeships that meet the required qualification level. 
 
3. FACTORS THAT AFFECT THE COST–BENEFIT BALANCE 
As previously discussed in section 2.1, many factors potentially affect a firm’s cost–benefit balance. 
This section presents the currently available empirical evidence of how training costs and benefits differ by 
factors, such as firm size, training occupation or sector, financial and non-financial incentives, institutions, 
training duration, and business cycle fluctuations. 
3.1. Firm size 
Large firms differ in many dimensions from smaller firms regarding their training behaviour. First, 
large firms need to replace a higher (absolute) number of vacancies, even if the turnover rates were 
comparable across firm sizes. In competitive labour markets, large firms can hire as many workers as they 
like at the going market wage. However, if the labour markets are monopsonistic, large firms will need to 
offer higher pay in order to attract a sufficient number of skilled workers. However, Manning (2006) 
argues based on a generalised model of monopsony, that firms can also increase their recruitment effort to 
hire more workers, rather than to simply increase wages. While a firm can increase its recruitment effort by 
searching more intensively for skilled workers in the external labour market (e.g. by posting more job 
advertisements), another strategy is to train more apprentices internally. Blatter et al. (2016) show that 
firms train more apprentices when it becomes increasingly costly to hire skilled workers from the external 
labour market. While the basic result applies to all firms, particularly large firms that hire many employees 
in a given period will find it increasingly difficult to exclusively hire from the external labour market. In 
line with this argument, training statistics show that the training participation increases strongly with firm 
size (Muehlemann and Wolter, 2013). 
Firm size may also be related to different cost–benefit components. While large firms often pay 
higher wages to all employees, including apprentices, large firms can potentially exploit economies of 
scale in the provision of training. Moreover, large firms may have better opportunities to instruct 
apprentices while being involved in the work process compared to small and highly specialised firms. 
However, large firms are not equally distributed across different training occupations. Large firms 
frequently train apprentices in technical fields that require a higher (net) training investment (see section 
3.2), such as metalworking or IT, compared to smaller firms that frequently train apprentices in the crafts 
sector. Moreover, large firms specialising in technical occupations frequently use separate in-house 
training facilities to train their apprentices, which is costlier compared to the traditional form of 
apprenticeship training (Strupler and Wolter, 2012). Thus, simply looking at cost–benefit statistics that 
compare large and small firms may not necessarily tell us much about firm-size effects, but rather shows 
the result of various factors that affect the cost–benefit balance differently across firm-size categories.  
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Table 8: Average costs and benefits by firm size, per apprentice, and training year,  
Germany (in EUR), 2012/13 
Employees <10  10-49 50-499 500+ 
Costs 15,911 16,452 18,111 21,757 
Benefits 10,807 12,199 12,720 14,403 
Net costs 5104 4254 5391 7354 
Source: Adapted from Jansen et al. (2015a), Apprenticeship training in Germany remains investment-focused – results of BIBB Cost-
Benefit Survey 2012/13, BIBB Report 1/2015. 
 
Table 8 shows that, in Germany, the training costs as well as training benefits increase by firm size. 
Thus, the net training costs do not differ much by firm size, except for the largest firm size category. As 
regards Swiss firms, the results reveal a similar picture (Table 9). However, the differences between firm-
size categories are much more pronounced than in Germany. While the highest net benefits are generated 
in medium-sized firms with 5-49 employees, large firms in 4-year programmes incur significant net costs 
of almost EUR 3 000 per apprentice per training year.  
 
Table 9: Average costs and benefits by firm size, per apprentice, and training year,  
Switzerland (in EUR), 2009 
Employees <5  5-9  10-49  50-249 250+ 
3-year programmes           
Costs 24,265 22,440 26,299 27,219 29,627 
Benefits 26,132 27,587 29,159 29,925 29,767 
Net costs -1867 -5147 -2860 -2705 -140 
4-year programmes 
     
Costs 24,499 23,246 25,024 29,478 29,403 
Benefits 26,036 27,637 29,910 29,056 26,425 
Net costs -1538 -4391 -4887 422 2978 
Notes: CHF/EUR exchange rate of 1.10 on 11 September 2015. 
Source: Adapted from Strupler and Wolter (2012), Die duale Lehre eine Erfolgsgeschichte - auch für Betriebe. Ergebnisse der dritten 
Kosten-Nutzen-Erhebung der Lehrlingsausbildung aus der Sicht der Betriebe, Glarus/Chur: Rüegger Verlag. 
 
3.2. Occupations and training domains 
There are large differences in the costs and benefits by sectors or occupational fields. Table 10 shows 
a substantial variation in net training costs by the domain of apprenticeship training and occupational 
groups in Germany. For example, the average net costs in technical occupations is almost EUR 9 000 per 
apprentice per training year, resulting in net training costs beyond EUR 30 000 in 3.5-year apprenticeship 
programmes. Conversely, apprenticeships in agriculture or commercial occupations require a considerably 
smaller net investment.  
Regarding the relative productivity of German apprentices in skilled tasks compared to an average 
skilled worker in the training firm, the corresponding values also differ rather strongly by training 
occupation (Table 11). While there are no differences by firm size regarding the relative productivity in the 
first training year, apprentices tend to have a higher relative productivity in the last training year, 
particularly in firms with more than 100 employees.  
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Table 10: Average costs and benefits by domain/occupational group per apprentice p.a.,  
Germany (in EUR), 2012/13 
  Costs  Benefit Net costs 
Domain of apprenticeship training       
Industry and trade 19,535 13,389 6146 
Skilled crafts 15,187 10,798 4390 
Agriculture 14,043 12,750 1293 
Free professions 14,474 12,769 3705 
Public service 19,801 11,768 8032 
Home economics 15,329 8945 6385 
Occupational group 
   
Commercial occupations 18,206 14,684 3522 
Industrial occupations 16,116 11,859 4257 
Technical occupations 19,092 10,153 8939 
Source: Adapted from Jansen et al. (2015a), Apprenticeship training in Germany remains investment-focused – results of BIBB Cost-Benefit Survey 
2012/13, BIBB Report 1/2015. 
Table 11: Average relative apprentice productivity, Germany, 2012/13 
Relative productivity of apprentices in skilled tasks compared to a 
skilled worker 1st year (in %) last year (in %) 
Commercial clerk (Office) 43.7 74.3 
Commercial clerk (Office communications) 48.2 63.5 
Commercial clerk (Industrial) 54.1 75.8 
Commercial clerk (Retail) 44.1 77.8 
Commercial clerk (Wholesale and export) 48.8 73.6 
Car mechatronic 15.3 68.6 
Cook 30.9 72.9 
Dental assistant 34.3 63.3 
Electronics technician 22.3 81.2 
Gardener 36.8 66.8 
IT specialist 40.4 67.4 
Joiner 33.8 65.1 
Logistician 46.2 79.6 
Medical employee 47.1 74.4 
Painter 30.9 62.7 
Public administration employee 39.5 70.1 
Systems mechanic 25.7 75.8 
Tax specialist 29.0 75.1 
1-9 employees 39.6 69.4 
10-49 employees 37.7 72.1 
50-499 employees 41.0 73.6 
500+ employees 37.1 77.2 
Source: Provided by the BIBB, based on Jansen et al. (2015a), Apprenticeship training in Germany remains investment-focused – 
results of BIBB Cost-Benefit Survey 2012/13, BIBB Report 1/2015. 
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Moreover, as the measure is ‘relative’ productivity (compared to an average worker in the same firm), 
the productive contribution of apprentices in large firms is likely to be higher in absolute terms even if the 
relative performance compared to a skilled worker does not differ across firm sizes. In large firms, skilled 
workers typically earn considerably higher wages (e.g. in Switzerland, large firms with 100+ employees 
pay almost 20% higher skilled-worker wages compared to small firms with  
1-9 employees). Thus, to the extent that higher pay reflects higher productivity, apprentices in large firms 
also generate higher training benefits in absolute terms. 
Table 12: Average net costs and relative apprentice productivity by training occupation, Switzerland (in EUR), 
2009 
 
Average net 
costs (per 
apprentice) 
Relative 
productivity 
1st year (in %) 
Relative 
productivity 
last year (in %) 
Training 
duration 
(in years) 
Electrician -47,393 18.6 79.2 4 
Dental assistant -46,239 36.8 84.8 3 
Painter -39,323 32.5 71.7 3 
Carpenter -32,828 30.5 67.3 3 
Gardener -26,545 31.6 71.9 3 
Social care specialist -21,437 38.5 79.2 3 
Plumbing and heating engineer -20,649 27.6 69.8 3 
Joiner -19,986 22.7 68.7 4 
Medical assistant -18,925 33.8 82.5 3 
Retail worker -13,186 41.3 79.7 3 
Health care specialist -10,858 26.6 73.1 3 
Logistician -8986 33.4 76.7 3 
Civil engineering draughtsman -7705 18.8 72.0 4 
Bricklayer -5988 23.3 71.5 3 
Commercial employee 2765 41.1 74.3 3 
Car mechanic 6171 23.5 74.8 4 
IT specialist 6785 29.3 88.1 4 
Cook 8485 36.9 79.5 3 
Industrial mechanic (Polymechanic) 28,753 20.0 80.6 4 
Electronics technician 34,452 21.9 80.0 4 
other 3-year apprenticeships -6648 34.1 75.6 3 
other 4-year apprenticeships -9485 29.0 80.9 4 
Note: CHF/EUR exchange rate of 1.10 on 11 September 2015.  
Source: Author’s calculations based on Strupler and Wolter (2012), Die duale Lehre eine Erfolgsgeschichte - auch für Betriebe. 
Ergebnisse der dritten Kosten-Nutzen-Erhebung der Lehrlingsausbildung aus der Sicht der Betriebe, Glarus/Chur: Rüegger Verlag.. 
In Switzerland, there is a substantial variation in net training costs, ranging from a net benefit of 
almost EUR 50,000 when training electricians, to substantial net costs of almost EUR 34 000 for 
electronics technicians (Table 12). The example of the electrician illustrates the point regarding the cost-
elasticity of the firm’s demand for apprentices in section 2.1. The electrician is one of the most popular 
training occupations in Switzerland, and the most beneficial profession from the firm’s perspective. 
However, the situation on the product market is very competitive, and thus, apprentices are substituted not 
only for unskilled, but even more so for skilled workers early on during the apprenticeship period, so that 
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the remaining share of unproductive time at the workplace is only 18%.
22
 As a result, training firms have a 
competitive advantage to non-training firms and thus the ability to offer better prices. Consequently, a 
substantial fraction of the net benefits that a firm can generate during the training period will be passed on 
to consumers in the form of lower prices for the services of electrician. Conversely, the examples of the 
electronics technician and industrial mechanic (Polymechanic) illustrate the importance of post-training 
benefits. In these occupations, external hiring costs average more than EUR 32,000, thereby justifying a 
net investment in apprenticeship training in order to save future hiring costs for skilled workers (Blatter et 
al., 2016).
23
  
For Swiss apprentices, there is a tendency for 3-year apprenticeships that the last-year productivity in 
large firms with more than 100 employees is somewhat higher, but the effect is not very strong in 
economic terms (Table 13). Moreover, there are no statistically significant differences among firms with 
less than 100 employees. In the four-year apprenticeships, there are no significant differences by firm size. 
Table 13: Average relative apprentice productivity by firm size, Switzerland (in EUR), 2009 
  
1-9 
employees 
(in %) 
10-49 
employees (in 
%) 
50-99 
employees (in 
%) 
100+ 
employees 
(in %) 
1st year relative productivity of apprentices in 
skilled tasks 
    
Commercial employee  40.4 44.4 37.5 38.5 
3-year apprenticeships 35.2 37.1 34.9 35.8 
4-year apprenticeships 24.2 25.1 27.9 25.7 
     Last year relative productivity of apprentices in 
skilled tasks 
    
Commercial employee  68.1 75.2 75.4 75.4 
3-year apprenticeships 73.3 74.7 74.6 77.9 
4-year apprenticeships 74.6 78.9 84.2 83.2 
Source: Own calculations based on Strupler and Wolter (2012), Die duale Lehre eine Erfolgsgeschichte - auch für Betriebe. 
Ergebnisse der dritten Kosten-Nutzen-Erhebung der Lehrlingsausbildung aus der Sicht der Betriebe, Glarus/Chur: Rüegger Verlag. 
 
3.3. Financial and non-financial incentives 
There are many financial and non-financial incentives to encourage firms to take on apprentices. In 
most countries with apprenticeship training, the government bears the costs for vocational schools (e.g. 
teacher salaries, infrastructure, etc.). Moreover, some countries reimburse the firms for their training 
expenses (e.g. the Czech Republic, Finland, Norway, or the Slovak Republic) or reimburse the company 
for the wages paid to apprentices (Denmark).
24
 In addition, there are local or industry-wide training funds, 
to which all firms contribute, but the funds are subsequently allocated to training firms. The rationale for 
such funds is to increase firms’ willingness to provide apprenticeship training, and simultaneously make it 
more expensive for non-training firms to poach graduated apprentices from other training firms. While 
                                                     
22 Own calculations, based on Strupler and Wolter (2012).  
23 In contrast to the electrician, the share of non-productive tasks of electronics technicians and industrial mechanics is 43% in the 
first training year. Moreover, in these occupations, some apprentices (between 22-24%, see Strupler and Wolter, 2012) 
spend the entire first year in an external training facility (Basislehrjahr) or an internal training center to acquire basic 
occupation-specific skills. Hence, net costs differ strongly: while net costs amount to  
EUR 50,000-60,000 for firms that place apprentices in external training centers, training by firms according to the 
‘classical’ dual model are able to break even by the end of training (Strupler and Wolter, 2012, pp. 109). 
24
 See OECD (2011), pp. 234, for more details. 
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some funds are run privately by professional associations, others are run locally by regional governments. 
Muehlemann and Wolter (2013) argue that the effectiveness of such training funds depends on the specific 
situation of the local or occupational apprenticeship market. As long as those firms that train apprentices 
do not incur substantial net costs, and if there is no scarcity of skilled workers in the external labour 
market, then there is little need for such schemes. However, if there is a general lack of skilled workers, 
and firms are reluctant to train apprentices because of the threat of poaching (Muehlemann and Wolter, 
2011), then such training funds may indeed have positive effects on the apprenticeship market. 
Another type of incentive that is not costly for the government is to link the award of public contracts 
to the provision of apprenticeships. Strupler Leiser and Wolter (2016) analyse the existence of public 
procurement policies in Switzerland on the probability that firms offer apprenticeship training. They find 
that small firms with less than 50 employees are more likely to train apprentices if public procurement 
policies are relevant for particular firms. Moreover, analysing different indicators for training quality (such 
as instruction time) does not reveal any adverse effects on the training behaviour of firms. However, even 
though such a policy is cost-efficient for the government, and appears to be highly effective, Strupler 
Leiser and Wolter identify at least three possible drawbacks: (i) there might be discrimination against 
highly specialised firms that cannot train due to a lack of appropriate training occupation; (ii) there might 
be discrimination against small firms (compared to large firms) in times when there is a lack of qualified 
applicants for apprenticeships; and (iii) such a policy may lead to too many apprenticeships in certain 
industries or occupations where public procurement is widespread. Nonetheless, public procurement 
policies may be a suitable instrument to increase a firm’s training participation when there is an excess 
supply of apprentices (although such an instrument would have to be limited to small public contracts that 
are not relevant to WTO guidelines). 
In Germany, firms received a training bonus (Ausbildungsbonus) to hire disadvantaged youth for new 
apprenticeships that started between August 2008 and the end of 2010 (Bonin et al., 2013). Disadvantaged 
youth are defined as individuals who unsuccessfully applied for training positions in the previous year, and 
had a low educational qualification at the compulsory-level (Hauptschulabschluss, Sonderabschluss), no 
completed compulsory education, learning difficulties, or come from a disadvantaged social background. 
For each disadvantaged apprentice, a firm received EUR 4,000, EUR 5,000, or EUR 6,000, depending on 
the corresponding tariff for apprentice pay. For hiring disabled apprentices, a firm could receive an 
additional 30% on top of the training bonus. A firm received 50% of the bonus at the end of the trial 
period, and the remaining 50% at the time when the apprentice was registered for the final examinations. 
Given the difficulty to assess whether the firm in fact offers an additional training position due to the 
subsidy, it would only receive a subsidy if the number of apprenticeship positions including the 
disadvantaged apprentices was higher in the three-year average (in the previous three years).  
However, the evaluation of the training bonus is not encouraging. According to Bonin et al. (2013), 
the training bonus did not create any additional apprenticeship positions. Moreover, there were no 
statistically significant differences regarding the training success (i.e. graduation rates, or transition in the 
labour market). Bonin et al. (2013) conclude that the design of the bonus was responsible for poor 
effectiveness, and resulted in very high windfall gains. In particular, a firm frequently applied for the bonus 
only once the hiring decision was already made, meaning that the firm only applied for subsidies for 
apprentices that meet the firm’s requirements, so that the firm would also have hired the applicant in the 
absence of the training bonus. Thus, there is no evidence that the training bonus led to substitution effects, 
so that disadvantaged applicants were hired instead of non-disadvantaged applicants. Moreover, while the 
criterion regarding the ‘additional training position’ is superior to a general subsidy to training firms that is 
independent of the number of apprentices, Bonin et al. (2013) argue that it is a disadvantage of the criterion 
that is not binding to firms that previously did not train apprentices (for some time). 
However, given that the net training costs in Germany are on average about EUR 5,000 per year per 
apprentice, it is not surprising that a firm only hires those disadvantaged applicants who they expect to 
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successfully graduate. Even when considering the subsidy, the firm is left with a substantial net training 
investment (particularly if disadvantaged apprentices also require above-average instruction time). Thus, a 
firm will only be willing to offer apprenticeship training under the training bonus scheme if it intends to 
retain an apprentice as a skilled worker afterwards. Conversely, for a firm to train disadvantaged 
apprentices at zero net costs (i.e. with a production motive), the corresponding training bonus would need 
to cover the entire net investment, which might be even higher than the average net costs because 
disadvantaged youth might need additional support from the company.  
In Australia, a recent withdrawal of a training bonus of 4 000 AUD led to a strong reduction in 
training enrolments in the service sector (Pfeifer, 2016). Particularly in this sector, training firms often 
offer low-quality training that results in low graduation rates (Snell and Hart, 2007) and only marginally 
better employment outcomes (Dockery et al., 2005). Conversely, in the traditional trade and industries, 
where more firms follow an investment-oriented training model, the withdrawal of the bonus was not 
accompanied by a significant reduction in enrolments. Thus, these results imply that even though subsidies 
increased training participation of Australian firms in the service sector, the benefits for apprentices from 
completing such a programme were often quite limited as the accumulation of skills was rather low. 
Evidence from Switzerland suggests that no subsidies are necessary for firms to hire applicants with 
bad school grades and invest in additional training time in occupations where training on average generates 
a net benefit (Muehlemann et al., 2013). Thus, designing an apprenticeship system that allows firms to 
train cost-efficiently while ensuring training quality might likely be the most efficient policy for a 
government to promote dual apprenticeship training that also encourages firms to train lower-ability 
school-leavers.  
Moreover, based on the simulations for Spain in 10 different training occupations, Wolter and 
Muehlemann (2015) show that there would always be a training model with a certain framework that 
allows a firm to train apprentices without having to make a net investment. While an existing Spanish 
training curriculum ensures the corresponding training content in vocational school, firms could offer 
apprenticeship training similar to Swiss firms (around five hours per week per apprentice) and still break 
even, as long as the training duration and apprentice pay are set accordingly. Thus, firms would be able to 
cover their training expenses if apprenticeships last three years, and if apprentice pay is set around 15-25% 
of the skilled worker pay (or 40-70% of the Spanish minimum wage), which is a scenario that is fairly 
similar to Switzerland where apprentices earn on average less than 20% of the skilled worker pay 
(Muehlemann et al., 2013).  
Summing up, the empirical evidence on the effectiveness and efficiency of subsidies to firms with the 
aim to increase training participation is not very encouraging, suggesting alternative forms of state 
interventions. The most promising type of state support might be the provision of (high-quality) public 
vocational schools, and the support of industry-specific training courses aimed at increasing transferable 
skills of apprentices. At the individual level, the provision of training subsidies for at-risk-applicants might 
be effective when such individuals can be readily identified, and if the provided subsidy is sufficiently high 
to cover a firm’s entire net training investment. While firms and individuals react to incentives such as 
subsidies, it is important to consider possible adverse effects of subsidy payments, and to ensure that a 
monitoring system is in place to prevent misallocation of funds and to enforce minimum training standards. 
Nonetheless, even when subsidies are effective, the question regarding the efficiency of subsidies needs to 
be considered as well.  
3.4. Duration of apprenticeship training  
The duration of a training programme is a very decisive factor both for the costs-benefit ratio of the 
firm and for an individual rate of return to an apprenticeship programme. At the beginning of an 
apprenticeship, apprentices are not very productive in skilled tasks, and firms make the highest investment 
in training (Malcomson et al., 2003). Tables 14 and 15 show how the costs and benefits of training evolve 
over time in Germany and Switzerland, respectively. Moreover, firms make a higher net investment in the 
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beginning of the training period when the apprenticeship duration is longer (i.e. 3.5 years in Germany or 4 
years in Switzerland). 
The training investment in Switzerland is even more front-loaded than in Germany (Table 15). While 
a firm makes a net investment of more than EUR 6,000 in the first 2 years of a 4-year apprenticeship 
programme, it already generates sufficient net benefits in the last two years to recoup its initial investment. 
However, three years would not have been sufficient to cover the initial training expenses. Thus, from the 
firm’s perspective, a longer training duration clearly increases the probability to cover the initial training 
investment. Yet, looking at the German case in Table 14 shows that firms do not generate a net benefit 
even in the last year of the training, although the amount of net investment decreases over time. 
 
Table 14: Costs and benefits of apprenticeship training in Germany by duration and training year (in EUR), 
2012/13 
Duration   
1st year (mean) 2nd year (mean) 
3rd year 
(mean) 4th year (mean) 
2 years Costs 15,823 17,713   
 Benefits 10,561 12,358   
 Net costs 5262 5355   
3 years Costs 16,827 17,686 18,528  
 Benefits 11,367 13,757 16,564  
 Net costs 5460 3928 1964  
3.5 years Costs 19,612 19,742 20,528 12,700 
 Benefits 6866 9636 13,139 7594 
  Net costs 12,746 10,105 7389 5106 
Source: Adapted from Jansen et al. (2015a), Apprenticeship training in Germany remains investment-focused – results of BIBB Cost-
Benefit Survey 2012/13, BIBB Report 1/2015. 
Table 15: Costs and benefits of apprenticeship training in Switzerland by duration and training year (in EUR), 
2012/13 
Duration   
1st year 
(mean) 2nd year (mean) 
3rd year 
(mean) 
4th year 
(mean) 
3 years Costs 24,605 24,876 29,077  
 Benefits 
24,425 27,848 34,207 
 
 Net costs 
182 -2972 -5130 
 
4 years Costs 24,523 24,528 26,881 29,223 
 Benefits 
19,486 23,369 30,482 39,442 
  Net costs 5036 1159 -3601 -10219 
Note: CHF/EUR exchange rate of 1.10 on 11 September 2015.  
Source: Adapted from Strupler and Wolter (2012), Die duale Lehre eine Erfolgsgeschichte - auch für Betriebe. Ergebnisse der dritten 
Kosten-Nutzen-Erhebung der Lehrlingsausbildung aus der Sicht der Betriebe, Glarus/Chur: Rüegger Verlag. 
 
 
From the individual’s perspective, a longer training duration must not necessarily translate into higher 
post-training earnings, particularly if firms use the extra year to recoup their training investment (rather 
than to invest in more human capital). Oosterbeek and Webbink (2007) find that an extra year of 
apprenticeship training in the Netherlands (although back in 1975) did not have a statistically significant 
wage effect. Oosterbeek and Webbink (2007) show that the extra year of training was awarded an equally 
EDU/WKP(2016)17 
 38 
high pay rise as a year of work experience, and conclude that the amount of human capital provided under 
the old system may have been roughly equivalent compared to the system with a longer training duration.  
 
Table 16: Allocation of time to apprentices at the workplace in Germany (3-year apprenticeships) 
Germany 
Year 1 
(mean) 
Year 2 
(mean) 
Year 3 
(mean) 
Unskilled tasks (𝛽𝐸  ) 48.5% 36.9% 29.1% 
Skilled tasks ( 𝛼𝐸 ) 26.4% 42.5% 53.7% 
Other activities with no direct value to the firm (𝜇𝐸) 25.1% 20.7% 17.2% 
Productivity in skilled tasks compared to a skilled worker 41.6% 57.8% 72.6% 
Source: Adapted from Jansen et al. (2015b), Labour market deregulation and apprenticeship training: A comparison of German and 
Swiss employers”, European Journal of Industrial Relations, 21(4) 353–368. Year of survey: 2007. 
In Germany, apprentices are allocated about 50% of unskilled tasks at the workplace in the first 
training year. However, the corresponding share declines to about 30% in the last training year  
(Table 16). Conversely, the share of skilled tasks increases from about 25% in the first year to more than 
50% in the last training year. Finally, the share of activities with no direct value to the firm (such as 
performing exercises and simulations) declines with the duration of the training from 25% to 17%, as 
apprentices become more skilled. A similar pattern can be observed for Switzerland (Table 17), although 
Swiss apprentices spend a somewhat higher (lower) share of unskilled work (non-productive tasks). 
 
Table 17: Allocation of time to apprentices at the workplace in Switzerland (3-year apprenticeships) 
Switzerland 
Year 1 
(mean) 
Year 2 
(mean) 
Year 3 
(mean) 
Unskilled tasks (𝛽𝐸  ) 53.0% 41.6% 31.5% 
Skilled tasks ( 𝛼𝐸 ) 25.8% 43.1% 53.7% 
Other activities with no direct value to the firm (𝜇𝐸) 21.2% 15.3% 14.8% 
Productivity in skilled tasks compared to a skilled worker 36.2% 55.8% 74.2% 
Source: Adapted from Jansen et al. (2015b), Labour market deregulation and apprenticeship training: A comparison of German and 
Swiss employers”, European Journal of Industrial Relations, 21(4) 353–368. Year of survey: 2009 
The use of apprentices in Swiss and German firms suggests that it is important to have apprentices 
perform unskilled tasks. On one hand, apprentices may develop certain desirable personality traits even 
when performing unskilled tasks (such as successfully completing an assigned task on time). On the other 
hand, the value of unskilled tasks to the firm is important to recoup part of the firm’s training investment. 
As apprentices receive an education at the workplace and also receive a salary, performing unskilled work 
at the beginning of an apprenticeship is a way to repay some of the costs of their education. Nonetheless, as 
apprentices become more skilled, it becomes increasingly beneficial for the firm to use apprentices for 
skilled tasks (which in turn reinforces the productivity growth of apprentices in skilled tasks). 
3.5. Institutions 
A country’s institutional setting can have a strong effect on the costs and benefits of training. 
Minimum wage laws and collective bargaining agreements directly influence wage costs of skilled and 
unskilled workers, as well as apprentices and, therefore, both the costs and benefits of training. Kriechel et 
al. (2014) show that collective bargaining agreements and the existence of a works council are both 
positively associated with apprentice pay. 
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Dustmann and Schönberg (2009) find that union membership matters, as the existence of minimum 
wage floors lead to compressed wage structures. Union membership consequently encourages firms to 
invest in firm-sponsored training, a prediction that is supported by the data. From 1996-1999, the average 
share of unionised firms that offered apprenticeship training was 36.15%, whereas the corresponding figure 
for non-unionised firms was only 15.46%. Similarly, regarding the proportion of trained apprentices to 
overall employment, 6.5% of the workforce were apprentices in unionised firms, compared to 2.9% in non-
unionised firms. Thus, the theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence show that unions can foster firm-
financed training.  
However, while unions provide incentives for firms through compressed wage structures to make net 
investments in apprenticeship training, apprenticeship training per se does not need to be financed by the 
employer. The case of the Swiss apprenticeship system shows that firms may indeed recover their training 
expenses by the end of the apprenticeship as long as apprentice pay is set at a reasonable level, and if 
apprentices can be involved in the firms’ production process.  
Germany was subject to major labour market reforms since 2003, aimed at improving the flexibility 
of the German labour market. Jansen et al. (2015b) analyse how that labour market reform affected the 
training behaviour of German firms (compared to a control group of Swiss firms that were not subject to 
labour market regulations). The results show that German firms, unable to significantly reduce apprentice 
pay (due to tariff agreements) or lower training investments (due to training regulations), used apprentices 
more productively after the reforms. While the share of unproductive tasks at the workplace of an average 
1
st
 year apprentice in Germany was 57% in 2000, the corresponding share fell to 25% in 2007, resulting in 
substantially higher (short-run) training benefits for the firm. While non-productive tasks may potentially 
have contributed to the accumulation of human capital, the empirical evidence shows that the productivity 
of German apprentices in skilled tasks even slightly increased from 2000 to 2007. Thus, the increased use 
of apprentices in the production process did not have an adverse effect on the accumulation of human 
capital. However, in Switzerland, there were no major labour market reforms between 2000 and 2009, the 
time between the first and the third cost–benefit survey. On average, the costs and benefits remained 
remarkably stable, although there were some changes within particular training occupations where 
apprenticeship reforms took place.  
Regarding the potential savings on hiring costs for skilled workers, Muehlemann and Pfeifer (2016) 
find mixed evidence about the institutional effects on such post-training benefits. While works councils 
tend to be associated with higher hiring costs, there is no evidence of a significant association between 
hiring costs and collective bargaining agreements. Moreover, Kriechel et al. (2014) show that firms with a 
works council are able to retain a significantly higher fraction (+15 percentage points) of their apprentices 
five years after training, even though the difference in the initial retention rate was similar to other firms.  
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3.6. Changes over time  
Apprenticeship training also reacts to dynamic changes. As the skill requirements in certain industries 
or occupations change, adjustments to training curricula are necessary so that graduated apprentices 
possess the skills that are demanded by other firms in the labour market. However, as firms cannot be 
forced to take on apprentices in a dual system, a major concern is how the firms’ demand is affected by 
business cycle fluctuations. Brunello (2009) argues that during a recession, there are two opposing effects: 
while the productivity of apprentices declines (due to less work volume), the opportunity costs of training 
decline as well, because (part-time) instructors are less frequently taken away from their regular work 
duties while training apprentices. Thus, the effect of the business cycle on net training costs is ambiguous. 
Moreover, as recessions are only temporary, the long-term benefits from training remain unaffected by 
short-term business cycle fluctuations. Bellmann et al. (2014) show that apprenticeship training in 
Germany was much less affected by the financial crisis in 2008/09 than continuing vocational training in 
firms, concluding that apprenticeship training is rather crisis-resistant even when firms face very strong 
economic shocks. Consistent with these results, Muehlemann et al. (2009) show for Switzerland that while 
the number of apprenticeship contracts is significantly associated with business cycle effects, the 
magnitude of the effects is quite small.  
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
Dual apprenticeship training requires a firm to make a training investment, mainly in the form of 
personnel costs for apprentice instructors and paying apprentices a salary. However, a training firm also 
receives a benefit because apprentices work productively during training. Moreover, retaining 
apprenticeship graduates as skilled workers may result in additional post-training benefits in the form of 
selecting the most suitable apprentices through employer screening, saved future hiring and firing costs, or 
by generating employers’ rents from being able to pay skilled worker wages below productivity (due to 
monopsony power). 
The empirical evidence from large-scale survey on the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training is 
limited to Germany and Switzerland. However, the results show that apprenticeship training may yield 
rather different outcomes regarding the required net investment of a training firm. While German firms 
make substantial net investments of more than EUR 5 000 per apprentice per training year, Swiss firms on 
average generate a net benefit from training apprentices. The findings suggest that the willingness of firms 
to make a net investment depends strongly on institutions and the labour market environment.  
In Germany, training firms are able to retain about 60% of apprentices as skilled workers after 
training, allowing training firms to realise post-training benefits. Conversely, the mobility on the Swiss 
labour market is much higher, as two-thirds of Swiss apprentices leave the training firm within a year after 
training, so that the expected post-training benefits for a firm are in general rather low. Small firms 
frequently have lower probabilities to retain apprentices as skilled workers, and are thus less willing to 
make a net investment in training. Consequently, it is particularly important that apprenticeship training 
does not require a substantial net investment in markets with a high share of small firms. 
While subsidies may encourage a firm’s willingness to participate in training (increase the demand for 
apprentices), the effectiveness of subsidies depends positively on the cost-elasticity of the demand for 
apprentices, such as the substitution elasticity regarding other types of labour (skilled and unskilled), as 
well as the degree of competition on the product market. As the demand for apprentices likely varies 
strongly across different sectors and training occupations, the potential subsidy schemes require a careful 
ex-ante evaluation of a firm’s demand for apprentices. Implementing subsidy schemes targeted at all 
training firms in an entire country are likely to result in large windfall gains. Moreover, the successful 
implementation of subsidy schemes also requires a monitoring system to ensure training quality. As long 
as the supply of potential (and qualified) apprentices is low and relatively inelastic (with respect to training 
costs), increasing the firm’s demand for apprentices by means of subsidies does not result in substantially 
more additional apprenticeship positions (but merely reduces the net costs of existing apprenticeships).  
From the individual perspective, apprenticeship training is only an attractive schooling choice for 
young people if they can expect that the accumulation of human capital during training will be useful and 
recognised in the labour market after graduation. Thus, training regulations should ensure that apprentices 
receive a substantial amount of general human capital that compares to other (full-time) educational 
programmes, and not mainly firm-specific on-the-job training. Once apprentices can expect good career 
options with a vocational qualification, apprenticeship training becomes more attractive for talented young 
school-leavers. Thus, training regulations should ensure minimum training standards, and standardised 
examinations at the end of an apprenticeship programmes, so that apprentices’ skills are recognised and 
transferable in a national labour market. In addition, an increase in the provision of human capital in 
vocational schools further increases future productivity (and therefore also future wages). Hence, an 
increase in the quality and quantity of human capital accumulation during an apprenticeship will increase 
the supply of potential apprentices, as apprenticeship training becomes a more attractive educational 
pathway.  
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Furthermore, an increase in the supply of suitable apprentices also affects the firm’s demand for 
apprentices. As more talented apprentices are more productive (holding other factors constant), an increase 
in the supply of more talented apprentices also leads to a shift in the firm’s demand for apprentices, leading 
to more apprenticeship positions. 
Finally, besides ensuring a certain level of training quality and quantity, and the external certification 
of skills, regulatory bodies can influence two additional factors that are important when a country decides 
to implement a dual apprenticeship system: (i) setting minimum apprentice pay; and (ii) determining the 
training duration. In the case where mandated apprentice pay is set substantially above the market-clearing 
level, there will be an excess supply of apprentices, as not all interested individuals will find an 
apprenticeship position. Additionally, the training duration needs to be long enough so that firms have 
incentives to make a substantial investment in human capital, yet still have sufficient time to recoup their 
training investment by having apprentices perform (skilled) work towards the end of the training period. A 
vocational schooling system that requires more attendance in vocational school at the beginning of the 
training period so that apprentices can spend more time at the workplace towards the end of the programme 
might further increase the possibilities of firms to break even by the end of the training period. 
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